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Strategic alliances have become important as inter-organizational cooperative 
arrangements. This is especially the case for multinational corporations. As claimed 
by Contractor and Lorange (1988): 
Until relatively recently, the study of international business management was 
substantially devoted to the problems of the multinational enterprise as a self-
contained and internally controlled administrative system. The standard 
operating paradigm was globally optimizing parent supervising a constellation 
of controlled or fully owned foreign affiliates. . .. There is a growing 
recognition, however, of the alternative modes of international business 
operations involving negotiated arrangements between two or more firms. In 
this mode, companies cooperate by sharing control, technology, management, 
financial resources and markets. . . . Yet, the firms chose cooperation over 
competition (p.xxv-xxvi). 
For instance, until 15 years ago, many U.S. multinational companies shunned joint 
ventures in fear of loss of control (Gomes-Casseres 1989); but recently, international 
joint ventures (IJVs) along with other forms of contractual arrangements have 
outnumbered the wholly-owned subsidiaries among U.S.-based multinational 
enterprises by 4 to 1 (Contractor and Lorange 1988). Even top American antitrust 
officials now believe that cooperative alliances will play a vital role in promoting the 
international competitiveness of the U.S. economy (McGrath 1984). 
Take UVs as an example. As a typical form of international strategic alliance, 
1 
joint ventures involve the creation of a new, separate, organizational entity jointly 
owned and controlled by the parent organizations (Pfeffer and Nowak 1976). 
Although joint ventures have long been known as a major foreign market entry mode 
for large multinationals in the developing or regulated economies, often under 
external mandates such as government investment laws, they have been increasingly 
used for broader strategic objectives, been wider in territorial scope and involved 
more varied partners in terms of size, type, and national origin (Contractor and 
Lorange 1988). The proliferation of new ventures reflects the growing recognition 
that the competition is increasing to the point where joint venturing yields strategic 
benefits which are otherwise unavailable (Arndt 1979). 
Strategic alliances are by no means limited to the international arena. It has 
been increasingly realized that most of business-to-business exchange processes 
involve long-term relationships, and such interfirm relationships are important in the 
maintenance of sustainabie competitive advantages (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; 
Webster 1992; Powell 1990; Day 1990). Indeed, the trend toward strategic alliances 
has recently accelerated so dramatically that it is considered as a genuine paradigm 
shift by marketing scholars (Kotler 1991; Webster 1992; Morgan and Hunt 1994). 
Ongoing Negotiation in Strategic Alliance 
Despite their popularity, the success of strategic alliances tends to be 
problematic and have a high failure rate (Sherman 1992; Killing 1983; Beamish 
1988). Traditionally, academicians concentrate on formal control me.chanisms for 
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explanation and remedy, with share of equity participation being a central concern. 
While formal structure and partner selection are important, disagreements or conflicts 
that occur during day-to-day interactions may lead to deterioration of the relationship 
(Dabholka, Johnston, and Cathey 1994; Lane and Beamish 1990; Ring and Van de 
Ven 1994). In other words, a successful cooperation may not so much depend on the 
degree of equity participation as on the partners' daily interactions, since the process 
of collaborative exchange takes place at operating levels and conflict tends to occur in 
seemingly routine aspects of interaction between partners (Meyer 1993; Hamel 1991; 
Friedmann and Beguin 1971). Increasingly, alliance management has been criticized 
for its emphasis of the initial alliance structure and formation while giving little 
attention to the ongoing negotiation after an alliance has started operation. 
The timeliness of negotiation research has resulted from recent shifts in 
marketing theory from a focus on discrete transactions to relational exchange (Dwyer, 
Schurr, and Oh 1987). Relational exchange denotes long-term, continuous, and 
complex relationships in which the individual transactions are of relatively little 
importance compared to the relationship itself (MacNeil 1980). Since exchange 
relationships evolve and inevitably entail disagreements over time, effective handling 
of ongoing negotiation becomes central to managing such associations (Ring and Van 
de Ven 1994). As a unique mode for resolving disagreements, negotiation differs 
from other conflict management approaches (dissolution of the relationship, third 
party mandates, etc.) in that participants tend to bear an explicit intent to reach an 
agreement (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). Therefore, it is more likely to be adopted by 
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parties involved in long-term relationships, given the belief that the ongoing 
relationship must be safeguarded. 
Although relational exchange is believed to subscribe partners to certain types 
of negotiation behavior, rather different approaches are actually adopted by alliance 
partners, which in tum have critical organizational consequences. In general, an 
amicable resolution may increase productivity and level of satisfaction in the working 
partnership (Anderson and Narus 1990), while a hostile negotiation approach may 
lead to relationship dissolution (Morgan and Hunt 1994). Negotiation's impact is so 
overwhelming that some scholars. use it to model the entire evolution process of long-
term exchange relationships (Dabholkar, Johnston, and Cathey 1994). 
Joint Venture Partners' Use of Negotiation Approaches 
Joint venture success is inherently problematic since a joint venture involves 
two (or more) parent companies with divergent goals and interests (Friedmann and 
Beguin 1971; Killing 1983). Because of this, joint venture operations are actually 
series of face-to-face negotiation (Adler and Graham 1989). Indeed, negotiation is a 
more critical component of joint venture operation than of nonequity-based strategic 
alliances, since j_oint. venture partners are usually unable to eliminate conflicts by 
leaving the relationship (Arndt 1979). In other words, as long as a joint venture 
partnership is considered worth the effort to sustain, partners would prefer negotiation 
activities that are more integrative in nature than other conflict resolution strategies. 
A review of the joint venture literature, supplemented with the findings from 
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the field interviews with managers in Sino-foreign joint ventures, reveals four 
negotiation approaches that are used by joint venture partners. These four negotiation 
approaches -- Problem-Solving, Compromising, Forcing, and Legal Recourse -- are 
examined in this study. 
Problem-Solving is evident when the participants openly exchange information 
about goals and priorities and continually propose new alternatives (Pruitt 1981). 
With such an integrative approach, the intent is to search for a solution acceptable to · 
both parties, while the tone tends to be ~rsuasive or argumentive . 
. -.. 
Compromising refers to the negotiation approach that seeks a middle ground 
between the initial positions of both parties (Froman and Cohen 1970). Although 
such a strategy tends to stop short of fully exploring the best available alternative 
(Pruitt and Lewis 1977), the intent to reach an agreement equally acceptable to both 
parties is more recognizable than with the problem-solving approach. Many joint 
venture partners, in fact, simply refer to the compromising approach as cooperation. 
Forcing is the strategy when power is used to make the other party comply 
(Blake and Mouton 1964). In a joint venture context, a major way of forcing is to 
win one's own concerns with voting rights based on majority ownership. Other 
sources of power in joint ventures include management responsibilities, technology 
expertise, and backups from a partner's government (Friedmann and Beguin 1971). 
Legal Recourse is observed where a party appeals to a formal legal agreement 
to gain compliance (Frazier and Summers 1984). Given a joint venture's high degree 
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of contractual formality, legal documents provide a unique basis upon which joint 
venture partners carry out ongoing negotiation. 
Joint ventures involve divergent goals and interests. At any negotiation table, 
parties have a tendency to search for resolutions which best serve their own interests, 
the tendency leading to assertive behavior in negotiation. However, joint venture 
partners also share a common or complementary objective such that the concerns 
about "common good" outcomes will result in an integrative or cooperative tendency 
toward negotiation. While each partner has reasons to pursue its own objectives, the 
joint venture partnership will be endangered if the partners are only concerned about 
their own organizations. 
Given the significance of negotiation processes in the maintenance and 
development of long-term relationships, if critical antecedents to partner negotiation 
approaches can be identified, remedies for preventing strategic alliances from failing 
may be proposed. 
Antecedents to Negotiation Behavior 
To fully understand partner negotiation behavior in joint ventures, a 
systematic, integrated model identifying the antecedents to the selection of negotiation 
approaches is needed. The objective of the present study is to better understand such 
linkages. The research will draw on the existing literature and managerial 
observations to suggest a set of critical relational factors that have a bearing on the 
use of different negotiation approaches and to examine them empirically. 
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The literature in marketing and related disciplines identifies three relationship 
characteristics that have significant influence on negotiation behavior: relationship 
commitment, trust, and relative power. This study will examine these variables as 
antecedents of various negotiation approaches used in the joint venture context. The 
three variables are briefly discussed below. 
Relationship Commitment 
Relationship commitment is "an enduring desire to maintain a valued 
relationship" (Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992, p.316). As an attitudinal 
variable, relationship commitment denotes the willingness to implicitly or explicitly 
pledge relationship continuity between exchange partners (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 
1987). A committed party will exhibit an explicit long-term orientation, that is, a 
willingness to make short-term sacrifice to maintain the relationship (Ganesan 1993). 
Relationship commitment is an important variable when studying negotiation 
approaches adopted by alliance partners. Considered as a sense of duty to the venture 
and the other partner, it provides a basis on which problems are addressed and 
solved. For instance, while information exchange and problem-solving are more 
likely to be initiated by a committed party, the forceful, dominant approach tends to 
be practiced by a partner who commits little to maintaining and nourishing the 
relationship (Lane and Beamish 1990). 
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Trust refers to the belief that a party's word or promise is reliable and a party 
will fulfil his/her obligations in an exchruige relationship (Blau 1964; Rotter 1967; 
Schurr and Ozanne 1985). While trust has long been important in the marketing 
channel domain, it is considered as key to a successful strategic alliance (Spekman 
1988; Ganesan 1993; Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993). 
Trust is seen as being supportive of certain negotiation approaches. Given 
strong trust in a relationship, partners "are more likely to work out their 
disagreements amicably" (Anderson and Narus 1990, p.45). For instance, trusting 
relationships are more likely to lead to problem-solving and exchange of information 
(Pruitt 1981). Trust may also impact the extent to which a partner relies on formal 
legal documents as tools for conflict resolution purpose. When each party has 
confidence that the other party will interpret the uncertain future in a cooperative 
manner, working out of all contingencies into contract form becomes unnecessary 
(Ouchi 1980; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Ring and Van de Ven 1994). Based on 
such reasoning, use of a legalistic approach should be less likely between trusting 
partners. 
Relative Power 
Power, defined as a potential for influence on another's beliefs and behavior 
(El-Ansary and Stem 1972), has been consistently treated as an important variable 
affecting negotiation behavior (Kahn et al. 1964; Deutsch 1973). Relative power, the 
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extent to which one party is more powerful than the other, results from the 
comparative levels of resources brought into the alliance by a partner. The resources 
may be direct financial investments by the parties or other resources such as exclusive 
import rights held by an in-country partner. It is suggested that unbalanced power 
encourages the powerful party to engage in more demanding or threatening behavior 
and less concession-making (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Dwyer and Oh 1987), whereas 
a balance of power leads to coordinative approaches from both parties, especially 
when switching costs are high (Dabholkar, Johnston, and Cathy 1994). 
Power -- or its reciprocal, dependency -- has long been considered as 
influential in marketing negotiation (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Frazier, Gill, and Kale 
1989). While, under more enduring relational exchange, relationship commitment 
and trust may be key to maintain successful partnership, power asymmetries and their 
influence on negotiation processes remain a facet of life (Harrigan and Newman 
1990). To reveal the interrelationships between power and various negotiation 
approaches, the present study includes it as one of the three independent variables that 
constitute the relationship context of negotiation behavior. 
National Culture 
A concept quite important to international strategic alliances is that of national 
culture. When partners come from different countries, they often bring to the 
negotiation table different cultural dispositions with which to interact. Studies have 
found that culture influences the negotiation's outcomes and processes as well as 
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perceptions held by partners of strn.tegic alliances (Parkhe 1991, 1993; Tse, Francis, 
and Walls 1994; Gundlach and Murphy 1993). National culture's impact on 
negotiation activity can be examined from different perspectives. In the present 
study, it will be analyzed for its possible moderating influence on the proposed 
linkages between three relationship elements and choice of negotiation approaches. 
For example, a hypothesized negative relationship between trust and legal recourse 
may be stronger for one national group than for another, due to difference in some 
underlying cultural dimension(s). 
National culture consists of some fundamental values. With respect to 
negotiation behavior, four dimensions of national culture appear to have a bearing on 
the preference for negotiation approaches. These dimensions are Collectivism, 
Ambiguity Tolerance, Humanism, and Long-term Orientation. In this study, national 
1 
culture is operationalized by the respondent's native culture, i.e., American culture 
and Chinese culture. The information available in anecdotal and scholarly literature 
suggests that the American culture and Chinese culture provide substantive differences 
over the four culture dimensions. 
Collectivism concerns the relationship between the individual and his/her 
group. Depending on whether people belong to a collectivist culture or its antithesis, 
an individualistic culture, they will exhibit variance in the sense of interdependency, 
concerns with relational harmony, etc. Strong evidence in the literature shows that 
Hie cuitural dimension of collectivism versus individualism relates to negotiation 
behavior (Gudykunst 1988; Ting-Toomey 1988). 
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Ambiguity Tolerance indicates the extent to which a culture programs its 
members to feel comfortable in unstructured situations (Hofstede and Bond 1988, 
p.11). Cultural orientations regarding ambiguity determine people's attitude toward 
principles and rules, ideas, and interpersonal relations. Tolerance or avoidance of 
ambiguity has been found to impact communication and negotiation styles (Hall 1976; 
Levine 1985). 
Humanism denotes the extent to which human contexts are concerned in social 
processes (Yum 1988). A culture of humanism pursues trusting human relationships, 
relies on human affection in decision-making, and emphasizes social aspects in 
exchange processes. On the other hand, a culture of human-neutrality endorses 
rationality, concerns about task objectives, and refutes the interference of human 
affection in the accomplishment of goals. · A prominent example of the affect of 
cultural variance in humanism on negotiation is found in U.S.-Japanese joint ventures, 
in which American and Japanese managers hold different perceptions on the use of a 
legalistic approach in resolving disagreements (Sullivan et al. 1981). 
Long-term Orientation, as defined in the present study, refers to the cultural 
disposition toward shorter or longer time horizons within which gratification and 
reciprocity are allowed to be deferred. Since partnership has a time dimension, a 
paitner' s time orientation may influence his/her behavior pattern at the negotiation 
table. The use of compromising approaches, for instance, requires a partner to accept 
short run imbalanced reciprocity in light of future collaborative benefits (Anderson 
and Narus 1990). 
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The present study will thoroughly examine the influence of each of these 
cultural dimensions on negotiation behavior. National differences along these cultural 
dimensions will be discussed, particularly with respect to the national groups involved 
in the current study. 
Fundamental Questions 
In light of the timeliness of the research into relational exchange and the long-
due task of incorporating national culture into the negotiation process, this study will 
specifically address the research questions: (1) how do relational variables influence 
partners' use of varying negotiation approaches? and (2) how does national culture 
moderate the above relationships between relational contexts and choice of negotiation 
approaches? 
Negotiation behavior is a function of many contextual variables. This study 
will be confined to examining three relational factors -- relationship commitment, 
trust, and relative power. To empirically investigate the effect of national culture on 
negotiation behavior, the study will identify specific cultural dimensions of direct 
relevance. Assuming relational antecedents are of greater importance than cultural 
ones, however, the present study takes national culture as a moderating variable. The · 
study will: 
1. Examine a set of critical relational antecedents to partner negotiation 
approaches; 




3. Empirically examine the conceptualized associations among negotiation 
approaches, their relational antecedents, and national culture. 










Figure 1. Proposed Model of IJV Negotiation Behavior 
Study Design 
A survey research methodology will be used for the present study. It will 
include key informants from within UV s in order to obtain information on relational 
contexts and negotiation strategies used by the joint venture partners. The unit of 
analysis will be the joint venture as represented by joint venture managers. 
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The study will be limited to joint ventures involving U.S. and Chinese firms 
and operating within the People's Republic of China (hereafter China). These U.S.-
Chinese joint ventures are chosen as the research setting for several reasons. During 
the past decade, more joint ventures have been formed in China than in any other 
countries (Beamish 1993). By the end of last year, China had approved U.S. 
investments in 16,221 projects, which involved a total contractual overseas investment 
of $18.3 billion. More importantly, Chinese-foreign joint ventures have passed the 
initial experimental phase (Shaw and Meier 1993), so as to assure more consistent 
research findings. Finally, China, the cradle of Confucianism, represents a cultural 
system far different from that of the Western world that is ideal for national culture 
companson purposes. 
Measures within the study have been. adapted from prior research studies. The 
criterion variable, negotiation approach, will be measured using a scale adapted from 
Rahim (1983), Boyle et al. (1992), and Ganesan (1993). Measures of relationship 
commitment, trust, and relative power are adapted from several existing scales in the 
marketing literature (Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993; Morgan and Hunt 
1994; Ganesan 1993). Instead of directly measuring national culture, the present 
study will use Chinese and American managers as key informants to represent two 
different cultural groups, based on the identified cultural dimensions which are 
appropriate to distinguishing the Chinese and American cultures. 
Factor analysis, correlation analysis, and other statistical methods will be used 
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to purify the measurement scales. The research hypotheses will be tested using 
multiple regression techniques. 
Substantive Contributions 
The present study will make several contributions to existing literature. For 
an important but largely unexplored topic -- negotiation behavior in cross-cultural 
strategic alliances -- existing theorizing and managerial observations are synthesized, 
conceptual relationships are formally integrated, and a major step is made in rigorous 
empirical testing of hypothesized relationships. 
To Joint Venture Studies 
While numerous in volume, previous research on international joint ventures 
has largely been built upon economic models and pays little attention to behavioral 
mechanisms of ongoing negotiation. Admittedly, cost-benefit analysis and control 
mechanisms based on ownership are important. However, the actual processes of 
negotiation for ongoing issues are equally critical to effectiveness of joint ventures 
(Lane and Beamish 1990; Grandori and Soda 1995). 
To date, marketing scholars have paid little attention to interfirm relationships 
in joint ventures (Habib and Burnett 1989). Distinguishing joint venture partnership 
from those that do not involve pooling of equity interests, researchers tend to consider 
the latter (e.g., Heide and John 1990). By exploring joint venture processes from a 
negotiation perspective using existing concepts and models in marketing, the present 
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study provides a strong case for how marketing can contribute to the understanding of 
joint ventures as complex marketing institutions. 
To Relational Marketing Literature 
According to Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987, p.22), negotiation provides an 
excellent framework for research on relational exchange because of its rich traditions. 
The present study seeks to make contributions to the emerging research on relational 
marketing in two ways. First, it attempts to integrate two sets of critical relational 
factors in the study of relational exchange processes. When shifting focus from 
discrete to relational exchanges, some marketing scholars are challenging the central 
position of the power construct in research, in favor of cooperation-centered concepts 
such as relationship commitment and trust (Morgan and Hunt 1994). While 
recognizing the "lubricant" functions of the latter factors in relational exchange, the 
present study warns against the tendency of underestimating the critical role of power 
in inter-organizational relationships. In this study, relationship commitment, trust, 
and power are considered simultaneously as contextual antecedents to negotiation 
behavior in light of their "relational relevance". Their individual and joint effects will 
be empirically investigated in the joint venture context. 
Secondly, the present study examines the validity of some existing 
conceptualizations in marketing by incorporating national culture as a theoretical 
variable, responding to the call by scholars of relationship marketing (Webster 1992; 
Gundlach and Murphy 1993; Anderson and Weitz 1989). It has long been a concern 
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that marketing concepts and models developed in the United States and other 
developed countries might be context-specific (Cunningham and Green 1984; Frazier, 
Gill, and Kale 1989). For example, does the trust-negotiation linkage as proposed in 
prior research hold true across different settings, or is it specific to a certain societal 
context? This study is based on the premise that critical variables in relationship 
marketing, such as trust, can be better examined in a cross-cultural context and that 
UVs offer a testing ground for theory-building in this domain (Buckley 1991). 
To Sister Disciplines 
Marketing has been criticized as if it has only borrowed from, but seldom 
contributed to, other disciplines (Sheth 1992). The. findings of the present study will 
contribute to the understanding of cross-cultural communication and negotiation 
styles, issues that are of lasting interest to scholars in social psychology and other 
behavioral sciences. 
A major flaw of social psychology studies of cross-cultural negotiation 
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behavior is that they tend to treat national culture as an independent variable without 
fully considering other contextual factors that may be of greater importance to the 
preference for varying negotiation approaches. Another flaw of this literature is that 
scholars often stop short of identifying all relevant cultural dimensions other than that 
of collectivism-individualism. In contrast, the current study examines culture's effect 
on negotiation behavior within critical relational contexts (commitment, trust, and 
power). In so doing, it makes a major effort to identify those other (than 
17 
collectivism-individualism) cultural dimensions that have a bearing on negotiation 
behavior. 
To Marketing Practitioners 
The present study is built on the presumption that strategic alliances' high 
failure rates can be partially explained by partners' mishandling of ongoing 
negotiation and that such a managerial problem is potentially controllable 
(Niederkofler 1991). By specifically examining those relational factors that lead to 
different negotiation strategies, the study charges the international marketer with due 
attention to day-to-day interaction after the alliances are formally structured. 
The study investigates national culture's impact on partners' choice of 
negotiation strategies in a U.S.-Chinese joint venture context. As the world business 
has shifted focus from the Atlantic to the Pacific Rim, U.S. firms have more and 
more encountered oriental counterparts, not only as competitors but also as 
collaborators. Understanding the other party's culture will enable the marketer to 
implement effective negotiation strategies, to reduce errors in communications, and to 
take more of an adaptive stance in ongoing negotiation so as to manage the relational 
exchange effectively (Tse et al. 1988; Tse, Francis, and Walls 1994; McKenna 1995). 
Outline of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. The first chapter provides an 
introduction to the dissertation. Chapter II reviews existing literature to build a 
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foundation for the present study. The construct of negotiation will be defined and 
prior research in the realm of negotiation will be consolidated. In examining 
contextual antecedents of negotiation approaches, a detailed discussion will be devoted 
to variables that constitute the relational context of negotiation process. Then, a 
major effort will be made to identify cultural dimensions that are particularly relevant 
to negotiation behavior. The following chapter introduces the research design and 
methodology used in the study and lays out research hypotheses for empirical testing. 
In Chapter IV, the research results and tests of hypotheses will be presented. A 
comprehensive overview of the findings and limitations of the present study and 




Strategic alliances1 are gaining popularity as important marketing institutions. 
U.S. firms, which were known for refusing to enter such inter-organizational 
arrangements in the past (Friedmann and '.Kalmanoff 1961), are increasingly forming 
domestic and international strategic alliances. The primary increases have been in the 
international arena, where accelerated globalization is making alliances a sine qua non 
condition for corporate survival (Ohmae 1989). 
Despite their spreading popularity and importance, strategic alliances have a 
high overall failure rate, largely resulting from unsolved conflicts among alliance 
partners (Lorange and Roos 1991). For example, roughly one-third of the strategic 
alliances are outright failures and· the failure rate in developing countries can be as 
high as 50% (Sherman 1992; Beamish 1985). 
Traditionally, academicians have concentrated on formal control mechanisms 
for conflict management, with · structure of equity participation being a focal point of 
inquiry (Tallman and Shenkar 1994). It is suggested, for example, that a joint 
1• A detailed discussion on prior conceptualizations of strategic alliances is beyond the scope of the 
current study. In concert with Berg, Duncan, and Friedman (1982), we consider strategic alliances as 
including all inter-organizational arrangements among independent firms that work together to attain 
some strategic objective. 
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venture is most likely to be stable when one partner plays a dominant role based on 
majority share (Killing 1982, 1983). Reflecting on such a focus, previous research 
has largely been done around the structµral aspects of strategic alliances and the initial 
negotiations leading to the formation of the alliances. 
However, alliance success may not so much depend on the formal structure as 
on the partners' day-to-day interaction, since the exchange process takes place at 
operating levels and conflict tends to occur in seemingly routine aspects of interaction 
(Meyer 1993; Hamel 1991; Lyons 1991)~ Indeed, strategic alliances should be 
managed as a process, whereby ongoing negotiations unfold and modify an inter-
organizational relationship over time (e.g., Dabholka.r, Johnston, and Cathy 1994; 
Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad 1989). Such a process perspective is summarized in the 
following statement: 
Process, however, is central to managing IORs (note: IORs denote long-term 
interorganizational relationships). As agents for their. firms, managers need to 
know more than the input conditions, investments, and types of governance 
structures required for a relationship. These process issues also have 
important temporal implications for performance. The ways in which agents 
negotiate, execute, and modify the terms of an IOR strongly influence the 
degree to which parties judge it to be equitable and efficient .... also influence 
motivations to continue in, or terminate, the relationship over time .... may 
cast a positive, neutral, or negative overtone to the relationship, influencing 
the degree to which parties settle disputes arising out of the IOR (Ring and 
Van de Ven 1994, p.91). 
Compared with non-equity alliances, joint ventures2 rely more on the 
negotiation process for conflict resolution, since the partners are less able to solve 
2• Equity alliances refer to those involving equity pooling, represented by equity joint ventures, 
whereas non-equity alliances, sometimes called contractual joint ventures, refer to those without such 
equity participation (Teagarden and Glinow 1990). Throughout this manuscript, the tei;m joint ventures 
will be equivalent to equity joint ventures. 
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conflict by leaving the relationship (Arndt 1979). A defining characteristic of joint 
ventures is that a new, separate entity is created, jointly owned by the parent 
organizations (Pfeffer and Nowak 1976). In general, investments made by joint 
venture partners are more substantial than those made by partners of non-equity 
alliances. Such equity participation is used as a bonding tie that makes it more 
difficult for partners to exit the relationship. With such a concern, a win-win 
condition often is perceivably in the interest of involving parties (Lyons 1991). In 
addition, since joint ventures involve joint management, ongoing interactions tend to 
be more intense, in comparison with some non.:.equity alliances such as licensing 
agreements (Killing 1980). In short, negotiation should be a most viable tool for joint 
venture partners to resolve disagreements in maintaining beneficial relationships. 
Although strategic alliances do not necessarily involve participants from 
different countries, cross-cultural alliances are a more prominent manifestation of the 
phenomenon. As such, national culture has been identified as an important factor that 
influences the processes of conflict and negotiation within strategic alliances (e.g., 
Tse, Francis, and Walls 1994; Lane and Beamish 1990). Indeed, cultural differences 
in perceived functionality of conflict and in preferred approaches to conflict resolution 
are considered to be an area that calls for serious examination of the context-specific 
applicability of conventional theorizing on inter-organizational relationships (Parkhe 
1993). 
While research that specifically addresses the issues of ongoing negotiation 
within cross-cultural strategic alliances has been scant, there are two streams of 
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literature that can be used in laying a foundation for studies in this realm of inquiry: 
(1) the negotiation literature from multiple research traditions; and (2) the literature 
on national culture. This chapter reviews and consolidates important findings from 
these two streams of research. Since strategic alliances are chosen as the research 
setting of the current study, the review will make reference to the processes of 
strategic alliances. 
Conceptualizations in Negotiation Literature 
While the study of negotiation has been a multidisciplinary endeavor, its 
theoretical foundations have largely dwelled on the tradition of social psychology 
represented by such prominent scholars as Schelling (1960), Deutsch (1973), Rubin 
and Brown (1975), Thomas (1976), and Pruitt (1981). This research tradition 
expresses attempts to analyze aspects of negotiation with tools of behavioral science. 
Using a variety of methodoiogical tools, pioneering scholars have widely explored the 
nature, scope, and basic tenets of negotiation as a complex interaction process. 
Thanks to their effort, a: subdiscipline -- 11 social psychology of negoti~tion II has been 
established (Druckman 1977, p.15). Although some later studies intend to offer more 
sophisticated conceptualizations, the breadth and profundity of aforementioned 
foundation work have rarely been challenged. 
The importance of management of long-term relationships, as reflected in 
multiple forms of strategic alliances, has been recognized for some time. Not until 
recently, however, have academicians realized the critical importance of ongoing 
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negotiation in these interfirm arrangements, reflecting on the inability of structural 
economic frameworks in explaining the high failure rate of strategic alliances 
(Dabholkar, Johnston, and Cathey 1994; Ring and Van de Ven 1994). In addition to 
describing inter-organizational relationships as a developmental process, scholars in 
marketing as well as in management and international business put special emphasis 
on the crucial elements that determine partners' interaction behavior under such 
collaborative arrangements (Achrol 1991; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Gundlach 1994; 
Niederkofler 1990; Buckley and Casson 1988; Gulati 1995). To obtain a more 
fruitful understanding of ongoing negotiations in strategic alliances, consolidating this 
emerging but rather scattered literature is an essential first step. 
Prior research in anthropology, sociology, and comparative management has 
produced a sizable body of knowledge about national culture and its influence on 
human behavior. For instance, anthropologists' contributions to negotiation research 
have been to widen the conceptual focus of the field by viewing negotiation as 
problem-solving processes involving all kinds of social relationships (Gulliver 1988). 
Recent effort has been made by a group of scholars of so-called cross-cultural 
psychology/communications, who use national culture as an explanatory tool in the 
studies of negotiation and conflict behavior (Leung and Wu 1990). With further 
elaboration of specific cultural dimensions, this body of research can help lay a 
foundation for investigations of cross-cultural negotiation process. 
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Negotiation Defined 
The term negotiation merits explanation. As the study of negotiation has been 
an interdisciplinary endeavor, existing definitions of negotiation are not consistent. In 
general, researchers have approached the term from two perspectives: the mini-
processes view and the macro-processes view. The mini-processes view focuses on 
discrete actions leading to the resolutions of some issue. A dictionary definition 
exemplifies such a perspective: negotiation is to deal or bargain with another or to 
confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter (Rubin and Brown 
1975, p.2). 
Admittedly, negotiations for discrete transactions are important. However, 
many prominent scholars in various research domains have taken a macro-processes 
view of negotiation. According to this view, negotiation is an ongoing process of 
complex interactions. In contrast to the discrete bargaining between individuals over 
some sale or purchase, such a view takes into account interactive processes covering 
wide-range social contexts, such as conflict resolution and problem-solving, involving 
complex social units and longitudinal process (Rubin and Brown 1975; Guetzkow 
1977; Gulliver 1979; Stem, Bagozzi, and Dholakia 1977). 
Framing negotiation in a broad social context has had important effects. Most 
significantly, negotiation as an interaction process is considered not exclusively 
restricted to the management of specific disputes, but involves "anything that bears on 
the establishment or servicing of human relationships" (Rosen 1984, p.182). As 
explicated by Gulliver (1988): 
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In this perspective, particular interpersonal or intergroup relationships, indeed, 
whole social orders, institutions and organizations, can be perceived as being 
in more or less a continual state of negotiation and are, in a significant sense, 
the product of those negotiations (p.250). 
The macro-processes view of negotiation may provide a promising research 
avenue for the study of business-to-business relationships by supporting the view of 
marketing as exchange (Alderson 1965; Houston and Gassenheimer 1987). 
Negotiation traditionally is considered as a major component of comprehensive 
models of industrial buyer-seller relationships (Bonoma and Johnston 1978) and 
interchangeably is used to term the process of conflict resolution (Purdue, Day, and 
Michaels 1986; Ganesan 1993). As marketing scholars shift their focus to long-term 
exchange relationships, which are governed by negotiated agreements (Dwyer, 
Schurr, and Oh 1987), the processes of relationship formation, maintenance, and 
evolution can be examined as a longitudinal dyadic negotiation process, with the 
exchange relationships as a sequence of negotiation outcomes (Dabholkar, Johnston, 
and Cathey 1994). 
In keeping with the macro-processes view, the present study defines 
negotiation as a unique mode of interaction between participants with divergent 
interests and an explicit intent to reach an agreement. Also, conceptualizing 
divergence in interests as a generic term for conflict, negotiation is considered one of 
many mechanisms for resolving social conflicts (Ganesan 1993). 
Divergent Interests and Conflict 
The precondition of negotiation is the existence of divergent interests between 
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participants. Divergence in interests is evident when participants' original positions 
regarding the issues are different. Such different original positions are major causes 
for social units to interact with one anothe;r, no matter whether the case involves 
family members holding various preferences among a set of consumption options or 
concerns small-scale disputes between labor and management. As exemplified by 
these situations, participants' differences on original positions do not necessarily 
appear as overt behavior, but as latent attitude, perception, or affection between 
participants. Since all this divergence can be defined as conflict (Pondy 1967,), 
negotiation should be considered as one way to resolve social conflicts (Ganesan 
1993). 
Negotiation as Interaction Mode 
Negotiation is only one of the many ways to resolve conflict. In terms of the 
extent to which a resolution process is structured, negotiation may be distinguished 
from institutional mechanisms. Institutional mechanisms include such inter-
organizational arrangements as joint membership, exchange of persons, and co-
optation, which provide an institutionalized framework for resolving disagreements 
and even preventing them from occurring. In contrast, negotiation is an interactive 
mechanism, which is carried out within or outside the scope of existing 
institutionalized resolution mechanisms (Dant and Schul 1992; Ganesan 1993). 
As an interaction mode, negotiation entails joint actions. In other words, 
negotiation differs from other mechanisms of conflict resolution in its bilateral nature. 
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Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) describe three broad classes of conflict resolution 
procedures: joint decision making (negotiation and mediation), separate action 
(struggle, tacit coordination, retreat), and third party decision making (decision by 
judges, arbitrators, higher executives). In general, participants in a negotiation 
attempt to find resolutions that are mutually beneficial through a joint decision on 
matters of common concern (Gulliver 1979). 
The interactive nature of negotiation results in three important consequences: 
(1) relatively high likelihood of win-w1n resolution; (2) significant role of shared rules 
and norms in negotiation process; and (3) critical function of communication and 
exchange of information. 
Likelihood of Win-Win Resolution. In contrast to unilateral actions in conflict 
resolution processes such as retreat, negotiation is more likely to lead to a 
convergence. That is, at least one party, but usually both, must move toward the 
other. As such, the best possible alternative which requires one party to change 
altogether his/her original position or represents some new and integrative solutions is 
more likely (Gulliver 1979). Negotiation can also be contrasted to third party 
decision making such as arbitration, which often is more costly to the participants 
(Ury, Brett, and Glodberg 1988). In sum, since participants of hegotiation aim at 
escaping social conflict by locating some mutually acceptable outcome, it becomes 
"the main route to win-win solutions" (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993, p.xv). 
Shared Rules of Game and Norms. Negotiation is a nonviolent type of conflict 
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resolution process (Pruitt 1981). Negotiators compete with each other, but, 
ironically, in an integrative manner. In order to do so, "participants develop mutually 
shared rules and then cooperate within those rules to gain a competitive advantage 
over their opponents" (Schelling 1960). In other words, negotiation prerequisites 
certain governing principles acknowledged by the participants; some rules of game 
used to determined the correct behavior in a negotiation setting (Deutsch 1975). 
Since negotiation involves joint actions, negotiators have to act on certain 
social norms that prescribe appropriate behavior in this social encounter (Pruitt 1981). 
In effect, the regulation of social conflict may be a major reason for norm formation 
in the sense that norms not only regulate the way conflict is resolved, but may 
provide direct solutions to certain conflict situations (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). 
Fairness principles (equality, equity, and needs rules), for instance, are viewed as 
most important norms in negotiation (Deutsch 1975). 
Communication and Information Exchange. Rubin and Brown (1975) consider 
communication as a primary ingredient of negotiation. Since joint decision-making 
naturally involves exchange of information, negotiation indeed are two-way 
communications (Gulliver 1979; Walton and McKersie 1965). In marketing 
literature, negotiation strategies are examined in their communication. forms (Boyle 
and Dwyer 1995). For example, for parties involving long-term relationships, 
intensive two-way communication concerning expectations, goals, and performance 
· evaluations is critical for resolving disputes (Arndt 1979). It is spe,eulated that the 
level of information exchanged determines the extent to which conflict is likely to be 
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resolved (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). In fact, different negotiation approaches may 
be distinguished from one another by the extent to which information is shared 
between participants. For instance, hard bargaining involves minimal informational 
exchange, whereas problem-solving is characterized with self-disclosure and open 
discussion (Pruitt 1981). 
Modelin& Ne&otiation 
For years, students of negotiation have made efforts to identify variables that 
are associated with certain types of negotiation behavior and outcomes. These factors 
are relatively stable, constituting pressures or constraints upon negotiators and 
determining the direction and magnitude of resolution. In other words, researchers 
attempt to provide structural models of negotiation (Thomas 1976). Viewing 
negotiation as interaction over time, scholars have also attempted to understand the 
whole game of negotiation by examining the various stages that lead to the end-game. 
The results of this research stream are process models of negotiation (Gulliver 1988). 
Structural Models. Figure 2 schematizes a structural model of negotiation. 
As presented in the figure, structural models of negotiation focus on the conditions 
underlying the attitudinal and behavioral tendencies of the participants. Since these 
conditions are perceived as relatively stable, these models represent a structural 
perspective (Thomas 1976). For example, Rubin and Brown (1975) consider three 
sets of independent variables that affect bargaining processes: (1) structural context 
(social, physical, and temporal); (2) behavioral predispositions of bargainers 
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(individual difference, personality); and (3) interdependence of bargainers. In 
Thomas' (1976) structural model of negotiation, the behavioral tendencies of the 
participants are seen as shaped by four types of structural variables: (1) behavioral 
predispositions; (2) social pressures; (3) incentive structure (e.g., stakes in the 






Figure 2. Structural Model of Negotiation 
Marketing scholars have also examined various sets of contextual factors that 
determine the use of different negotiation strategies. Stimulated by growing interests 
in long-term strategic alliances, they have paid increasing attention to those variables 
that constitute the relational contexts of negotiation (e.g., Ganesan 1993; Dant and 
Schul 1992; Boyle et al. 1992). 
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Process Models. Process models consider negotiation as a process consisting 
of episodes or series of episodes, with each episode being a given conflict cycle 






Figure 3. Process Model of Negotiation 
For example, Thomas (1976) developed a process model which, from one 
participant's view, depicted five main events within an episode: frustration; 
conceptualization; behavior; other's reaction; and outcome. An episode of negotiation 
is over when some sort of outcome has occurred. In tum, this outcome may set the 
stage for subsequent episodes of interaction between the participants (p.895). 
In Gulliver's (1979) "developmental model", negotiation is described as a 
series of eight successive phases in each of which there is a particular focus of 
attention and concern by the participants. These phases are: search for an arena; 
composition of agenda, and definition of issues; establishing maximal limits to issues 
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in dispute; narrowing the differences; preliminaries to final bargaining; final 
bargaining; ritual affirmation; and execution of the agreement. The author 
emphasizes that the development of a giv~n negotiation is not linear and 
chronological. That is, it allows for two or more phases to overlap in time and for 
participants to return to an earlier phase (p.121). 
An Integrative Model. It is argued that both process and structural models are 
needed for a thorough investigating of negotiation. While the process models are 
helpful in understanding negotiation as art ongoing system, the structural models 
elaborate variables that constrain and shape the process dynamics and therefore may 
be useful for suggesting systemic changes (Thomas 1976). Figure 4 presents an 
integrative model of negotiation process that incorporates both process and structural 










Figure 4. Integrative Model of Negotiation 
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Individual 
As shown in the figure, negotiation comprises four stages and six sets of 
contextual variables. The four stages are: (1) Conceptualization of the Situation; (2) 
Adoption of Negotiation Approaches; (3} Interaction, including Interpretation of the 
other party's action; and (4) Evaluation of Outcomes. The four stages constitute a 
complete cycle of negotiation. Within a relationship, each cycle is partially shaped by 
the results of the previous cycle and in tum lays groundwork. for future cycles 
(Thomas 1976). The contextual variables, categorized as situational, psychological, 
relational, interactional, individual, and cultural, exert influences on each of the four 
stages of negotiation process. While additional variables may be identified, the six 
categories in Figure 4 have received consistent attention in prior research. 
Although all the four stages of negotiation process are important, the current 
study will only examine partners' adoption of different negotiation approaches. As 
such, the following sections discuss previous research on negotiation approaches and 
major contextual variables. 
Negotiation Approaches 
Conceptualizing negotiation as a unique mode of interaction for resolving 
disagreement, as presented earlier, requires the inclusion of several different research 
traditions, with careful attention to the different terminologies used. For example, in 
addition to conflict handling modes/orientations/styles (Blake and Mouton 1964; 
Thomas 1976; Rahim 1983), another behavioral mechanism can also be included in 
our discussion of negotiation strategy, that is, the influence strategies -- "The content 
34 
and structure of the communications utilized by a source firm's personnel in their 
influence attempts with target firms" (Frazier and Summers 1984, p.43). While the 
terminologies are different, a closer look at the conceptualizations of negotiation 
strategy and influence strategy each reveals that to a great extent they overlap one 
another. Indeed, the term negotiation is no more than another expression of the 
influence processes. As maintained by Gulliver (1979), negotiations are the processes 
whereby parties both bring influence and experience from influence from the other 
sources (p. 79). It is not surprising, therefore, that critical antecedents and behavioral 
manifestations of negotiation and influence process are largely identical. 
Categorizing Negotiation Approaches. The existing schemes of negotiation 
approaches are summarized in Table 1. Although different terminologies are used, a 
further examination reveals a great degree of consensus regarding the connotations of 
each negotiation approach. This is not surprising, since the basic dimensional models 
used by the authors in classifying the negotiation approaches are relatively consistent. 
For instance, Blake and Mouton (1964), Thomas (1976), and Rahim (1983) use 
identical two-dimensional models to differentiate varying negotiation approaches. The 
two dimensions are (1) concern for self; and (2) concern for others. For illustration, 




















CATEGORIZATIONS OF NEGOTIATION APPROACHES 
Dimension Description 
Problem solving Shared goals; mutual satisfying solution; information change 
Persuasion Attempt to alter other's perspective; moderate information exchange 
Bargaining Divergent objectives; Zero-sum orientation; gamesmanship 
Politicking Signal of failure of interpersonal means: third party intervention 
Problem solving Search alternatives acceptable to both by information exchange 
Smoothing Attempt to lessen degree of disagreements to prevent confrontation. 
Forcing Use power to make the other party comply. 
Withdrawal Avoid conflict by leaving the relationship. 




















Exercise of authority, power, majority rules, etc. 
Compromise, arbitration, etc. 
Consensus, integrative decision-making 
Implicit or explicit use of threats and persuasion arguments 
Develop solutions that integrate requirements of both parties 
Develop a middle ground between initial positions of both parties 
Ignore the existence of conflicts 
Make adjustments to the other party's position 
Certify to extend specified reward contingent on target's compliance 
Inform target that failure to comply will result in negative sanctions 
Contend that target compliance is required by formal agreement 
Ask target to act without mention of subsequent sanction 
Supply information with no specific action requested 
Stress that specific action is needed 
Reduce one's goals, demands, or offers 
Persuade the other to concede or resist similar efforts by the other 
Try to locate and adopt options that satisfy both parties' goals 
Do nothing or as little as possible 
Drop out of the negotiation. 
36 










Desire to Satisfy Other's Concern 
Figure 5. Thomas Scheme of Negotiation Approaches 
The scheme plots five negotiation approaches in a "joint outcome space" along 
two dimensions -- the degree to which one would like to satisfy his own concern 
("assertive") and the degree to which he would like to satisfy the concern of the other 
("cooperative"). For example, the competitive approach involves high concern for 
self and low concern for the other party, while the collaborative approach involves 
high concern for self as well as the other party. 
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Competitive approach demonstrates a win-lose orientation, whereby one 
party's domination must be accompanied by the other's compliance (Filley 1975). 
Adoption of competitive approach is evident when power is used to make the other 
comply. In Blake and Mouton's (1964} terminology, therefore, this negotiation 
approach is named as forcing. Since a competitive stance is likely to be expressed as 
non-concessionary behavior and gamesmanship, this negotiation approach sometimes 
is simply referred to as bargaining (March and Simon 1958). 
Collaborative approach "represents a desire to fally satisfy the concerns of 
both parties -- to integrate their concerns" (Thomas 1976, p.901). With this 
approach, parties would exhibit such behaviors as open exchange of information 
regarding goals and priorities and continual evoking of new alternatives. 
Accordingly, it is widely known as problem-solving (March and Simon 1958; Blake 
and Mouton 1964; Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). 
Compromise approach reflects "a preference for moderate but incomplete 
satisfaction for both parties" (Thomas 1976, p.901). That is, parties seek a resolution 
of disagreement by developing a middle ground based on the initial positions of both 
parties (Froman and Cohen 1970). Interestingly, Filley (1975) considered 
compromising as a lose-lose method, Since "each side only gets part of what it wants" 
(p.23). 
Avoidant approach, also referred to as withdrawal, is expected when parties 
seem indifferent to the concerns of the other party (Thomas 1976, p.901). As such, 
participants are ready to drop out of the negotiation (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). The 
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avoiding party may diplomatically sidestep an issue, postpone an issue until a more 
opportune time, or withdrawal from a threatening situation (Day, Michaels, and 
Perdue 1988). 
Accommodating represents attempts to satisfy the other's concerns without 
attending to one's own. "Under such an orientation, a party may be generous or self-
sacrificing for the sake of their relationship" (Thomas 1976, p.901). The 
accommodative approach is considered as cooperative-oriented, since the party's 
"long-run motives center around the desire for agreement" (Donnelly 1971, p.373). 
Influence Strategies. The taxonomy of influence strategies proposed by 
Frazier and his colleagues (Frazier and Summers 1984; Frazier and Sheth 1985) 
deserves special attention for the purpose of the present study. Drawing on findings 
from social psychology literature, this taxonomy distinguishes two general approaches 
in attempting to influence other party's decision-making process in a channel context: 
(1) noncoercive strategies, based on altering the target's perceptions regarding 
intended behavior; and (2) coercive strategies, not based on such perceptual change. 
The noncoercive strategies include information exchange and recommendations, 
whereas coercive strategies include promises, threats, and legalistic pleas. 
Perceivably, there are overlaps between this and other negotiation schemes presented 
in Table 1. For example, noncoercive strategies approximate the problem-solving 
approach, since the latter implies openness in expressing one's own concerns and 
evoking alternatives (Schurr and Ozanne 1985), which can be properly summarized as 
information exchange and recommendations. 
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The taxonomy of influence strategies has been most popular among marketing 
scholars largely because of its specification of various tactics used in influence 
attempts. One example is so-called legalistic strategy, referring to those situations in 
which legal contracts and informal binding agreements are used to obtain compliance. 
Since modern exchange relationships are likely to take on contractual forms, legal 
mechanisms provide one basis through which participants can engage in ongoing 
interactions (Gundlach 1994). Indeed, strategic alliances are contractual forms of 
long-term inter-organizational relationships, many of which are characterized by high 
degree of contractual formality, such as joint ventures (Harrigan 1985). Presumably, 
legalistic approach should be found important in such cooperative alliances. 
Contextual Relevance of Negotiation Approaches. While the aforementioned 
schemes adequately conceptualize the negotiation approaches that are possibly used in 
different social settings, scholars caution that attention should be given to the specific 
contexts of interaction (Frazier and Rody 1991). Some of the approaches may be 
consistently identified across different settings, whereas others may not logically be 
used under certain circumstances. For instance, research in industrial purchase 
negotiations (Perdue, Day, and Michaels 1986; Day, Michaels, and Perdue 1988) 
found that a majority of the purchasing agents used only three approaches when 
dealing with salespersons -- problem-solving, compromising, and competitive, 
whereas the other two approaches in Thomas' (1976) scheme -- accommodating and 
avoiding -- had little relevance to industrial purchase negotiations. As explained by 
these authors, the specific role-set or norms of industrial buyers may largely 
40 
determine which approaches should be used and which should not. Accordingly, a 
more appropriate research strategy probably is to develop topologies that are specific 
to particular negotiation settings (Perdue, Day, and Michaels 1986; Day, Michaels, 
and Perdue 1988; Perdue and Summers 1991). In keeping with this line of thinking, 
Ganesan (1993) considered only three negotiation approaches -- problem-solving, 
compromising, and competitive (aggressive) strategies in a study involving retailer 
negotiators, assuming the irrelevance of avoiding and accommodating strategies. 
Consequences of Negotiation 
The consequences, or the culmination of negotiation processes have been 
examined in different ways. One perspective is based upon how long the effect of 
negotiation will last. For example, Thomas (1976) distinguishes between "conflict 
aftermath" and "long-term effects" (p.909). The conflict aftermath or immediate 
consequence of the negotiation may be some type of agreement or no agreement at 
all. The agreement, again, might be an agreement on all the issues in dispute, or it 
deals with only some of the issues in dispute as if the negotiation has been cut short 
(Gulliver 1979). In terms of outcome allocation, three situations are possible: (1) 
victory for one of the parties; (2) a simple compromise; and (3) a win-win agreement 
(Pruitt and Canevale 1993). 
Negotiation has various long-term effects. In most cases, the immediate 
outcome of a negotiation process will affect the future relations of the parties and 
their attitudes about each other, that is, "leave the parties with positive or negative 
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changes in resources and with attendant feelings which are also positive or negative" 
(Filley 1975, p.17-18). The process and outcomes of individual negotiations may 
well define the action course for later interaction between the parties. For instance, 
the use of certain negotiation strategies can be reinforced and distrust may be 
developed between parties (Thomas 1976). In a long-term relationship, each 
negotiation episode can be seen as one of a sequence of episodes that constitute the 
relationship between the participants (Ganesan 1993). Since negotiation experiences 
typically are not one-shot transactions with strangers, the ongoing relationship often is 
the outcome of greatest importance to participants (Greenhalgh and Chapman 1995). 
An important measure of negotiation consequences is the level of negotiator 
satisfaction, defined as a positive affective state based on an appraisal of all aspects of 
the negotiation (Ganesan 1993). A party's satisfaction is related to the immediate 
outcomes of the negotiation such as the concessions made by the other party (Kelley 
and Thibaut 1978; Thomas 1976) as well as to the negotiation process itself, that is, 
the way the negotiation is carried out and the other party's behavior in the negotiation 
(Scheer and Stem 1992; Keith, Jackson, and Crosby 1990; Brown and Frazier 1978). 
In business-to-business interaction, for example, satisfaction would be reduced if each 
participant knows that both are withholding information that could allow better 
outcomes (Dabholkar, Johnston, and Cathey 1994). 
Antecedents of Negotiation Approach 
Since participants may choose different negotiation approaches, which in turn 
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will lead to rather different consequences, the researcher must answer the question: 
What are the conditions that affect the choice people make among the various 
approaches available to them in negotiation? Scholars in the fields of social 
psychology, communications, political science, organizational behavior, economics, 
law, and marketing have identified several sets of antecedent factors of different 













Personality; Interpersonal attraction; Gender 
Reciprocity 
Nature of relationship; Relational Norms; Commitment; Power; Trust 
Value orientations; Cultural distance 
These antecedents are contextual variables influencing participants throughout 
the entire negotiation process. However, not all these variables assert equal influence 
as circumstances change. As in the present study, which investigates ongoing 
negotiation in an inter-organizational setting, relational variables are perceivably more 
critical than those derived from individual properties and psychological. states. To 
begin, I will briefly examine four sets of contextual variables that have received much 
attention in previous studies -- situational, psychological, individual, and interactive. 
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Then, a detailed review will be devoted to variables that constitute the relational 
contexts of negotiation process. Although national culture's role has been recognized 
in prior negotiation research, systematic treatment of national culture as a theoretical 
variable is lacking. The discussion of national culture as context for negotiation 
deserves a separate section. 
Situational. When participants enter a problem area, conceptualization of the 
situation is the first step for them to decide on the approach(es) to be ta.ken. In other 
words, negotiators need first to define the issues of disagreement. Since negotiations 
are always around some issue(s), conflict management is indeed a form of "issue 
management" (Fisher 1964). Issues can be defined in terms of their size; for 
instance, large issues are more difficult to be resolved than smaller issues. The 
second aspect of issue definition pertains to the importance attached to issues (Dant 
and Schul 1992). Policies and procedures in channel management, for instance, are 
considered as different in their significance to the channel members (Stem and 
Gorman 1969). Another aspect of issue definition is discussed in terms of level of 
conflict, that is, how intense the disagreement is felt by the participants (Ganesan 
1993). A study involving 22 buying centers across three buying stages, for example, 
found that more confrontational modes of resolution were used as the level of conflict 
increased (Lambert, Boughton, and Banville 1986). Issue characteristics are often 
examined simultaneously. For example, a recent study examined three issue 
characteristics: issue size; issue stakes; and issue complexity. Although there is an 
overall high incidence of integrative problem-solving approach, third-party 
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intervention may be preferred when the dispute issues involve high stakes, 
complexity, and policy connotations (Dant and Schul 1992). 
Psycholosical. The traditional, dominant theoretical paradigm in negotiation 
research originates from psychology, whereby negotiation approaches are considered 
as resulting from certain psychological states (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). The 
psychologists, however, are divided by contrasting views on the role of motives and 
cognition. 
According to the motivational explanation of negotiation behavior, negotiation 
is a contest between two rivals with conflicting motives such that the task of a 
negotiator is to detect the intentions of the other parties with regard to their preferred 
distribution of outcomes (McClintock 1977). Such a motivation orientation has led to 
a large body of experimental and prescriptive studies, best represented by game 
studies. In a variety of games (e.g., prisoner's dilemma; resource dilemma), the 
negotiators are observed as if they employ various strategies to· achieve optimal 
outcomes/utilities under a set of rules (Thorngate 1973). 
Another psychological orientation derives negotiation behavior from cognitive 
properties. Without denying the role of motivational factors in conflict and 
negotiation, a group of cognitive psychologists argue that the cognitive aspects of 
interpersonal conflict should be given due consideration. According to social 
judgment theory (Hammond et al. 1975), for example, disagreements may be 
conceptualized as cognitive conflict since the real causes often result from 
participants' different interpretations of the situations (Brehmer and Hammond 1973). 
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Researchers have identified a variety of cognitive effects and their underlying 
mechanisms, including the fixed-pie assumption, illusory conflict, reactive 
devaluation, anchoring, framing, and mood states (see Pruitt and Carnevale 1993 for 
a review). Empirical evidence has been provided for the cognitive explanation of 
negotiation behavior both in and outside the laboratory. 
While psychological perspectives of negotiation behavior are rich in 
conceptualization and laboratory evidence, their application in research has been 
criticized as overly simplistic (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). For example, the role of 
the cognition of individual participants, that may be significant in interpersonal 
negotiations but should not be overestimated in inter-organizational negotiation 
settings. Recent studies have also challenged the basic assumption of the motivational 
orientation that negotiator are always trying to maximize self-interest. For instance, 
the dual concern models (Blake and Mouton 1964; Thomas 1976; Rahim 1986) make 
better predictions about negotiation strategy preference since, in reality, the 
participants may also bear a concern about the other's interests (Filley 1975). 
Individual. It is suggested that individuals have tendencies to behave 
consistently across different conflict situations (Thomas 1976). Blake and Mouton 
(1978) refer to such consistency as individuals' dominant styles of bt!havior. 
However, there has been strong disagreement on the impact of individual differences 
on preference for negotiation strategies. Some social psychologists view personalities 
of the negotiators as a background variable that influences negotiation behavior. 
Terhune (1970), for example, argued that personality has an effect on initial behavior 
46 
and subsequent interactive (reaction) behavior in negotiations. In reviewing extant 
empirical findings, Hermann and Kogan (1977) isolated the independent and 
interactive effects of eight personality variables on behavior in the prisoner's dilemma 
game. These personality variables are: anxiety, authoritarianism, cognitive 
complexity, tendency toward conciliation, dogmatism, risk-avoidance, self-esteem, 
and suspiciousness. While these studies suggest the inclusion of personality variables 
in negotiation research, the overall effort has yielded confusing and inconsistent 
findings (Pruitt 1981; Rubin and Brown 1975). Even Hermann and Kogan (1977), 
the advocates of a personality perspective, realize that subtle effects of personality 
variables can be observed only if a large number of personality variables are 
incorporated into a study. 
Previous studies have also examined other individual factors that might 
influence preference for various negotiation approaches, such as interpersonal 
attraction/similarity (Apfelbaum 1974) and gender (Lim and Carnevale 1990; Kimmel 
et al. 1980). As in the case of personality variables, the influence of these individual 
factors may be better detected in their interactions with other contextual variables 
(Pruitt and ·Carnevale 1993). 
Interactive. Negotiators are constantly reacting to one another's behavior, a 
phenomenon termed as reciprocity in negotiation literature (Pruitt and Carnevale 
1993). According to reciprocal action theory, the actions taken by one party will be 
responded to by the other party in an exchange relationship (Gouldner 1960; Kelley 
1983). It is even argued that each participant will take into account the anticipated 
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response of another before acting in a negotiation {Apfelbaum 1974). For example, 
matching of concession, contending, and problem solving is well documented in 
negotiation literature (e.g., Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Yukl 1974). Matching means that 
one party's action receives reciprocal action from the other party. 
Several marketing scholars have examined the reciprocal behavior in the 
channel relationship context (e.g., Lusch 1976; Frazier and Summers 1986; Stem and 
Gorman 1969; Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Frazier and Rody 1991). It is widely 
thought, for example, that if one party uses coercive actions, the other party will elicit 
coercive action in response (Stem· and Gorman 1969). --
Relational Antecedents to Negotiation Agproach 
Negotiation approaches are heavily influenced by the characteristics of the 
relationship between participants (Greenhalgh and Chapman 1995; Pruitt and 
Carnevale 1993). While much of the laboratory-based work has reduced negotiations 
to close encounters between strangers, real-world negotiations are more commonly 
embedded in ongoing interpersonal and inter-group r~lationships (Kramer and Messick 
1995). Given the fact that negotiation is a voluntary relationship, the participant is 
often self-constrained against driving the other away from the relationship and 
terminating the very process in which both chose to participate in the first place 
(Rubin and Brown 1975). Indeed, the relationship between the parties provides a 
fundamental "context" in which conflict and negotiation occur and therefore should be 
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treated as the central explanatory concept for understanding negotiation (Greenhalgh 
and Chapman 1995). 
Relational contexts of negotiation have received considerable attention among 
marketing scholars. For example, relativepower or dependency has long been 
accepted as a definitive contextual variable in channel interaction. Recently, students 
of relationship marketing have devoted increasing research attention to relational 
norms, i.e., expected patterns of behavior in long-term exchange relationships. For 
the purpose of the present study, this section examines five critical relational 
antecedents of negotiation approaches: nature of relationship, relational norms, 
relational commitment, relative power, and trust. 
Relationship Longevity. Inter-organizational exchange has a temporal 
dimension. That is, some exchange processes are simply discrete transactions, 
whereas others have a more enduring nature. According to social contract theory, 
relational exchanges involve joint actions between parties; the relationship has a long-
term orientation; and interdependence is high. Discrete exchanges, in contrast, focus 
on individual transactions; the parties tend to be short-term oriented; and 
interdependence is low (MacNeil 1980). Marketing scholars have long acknowledged 
that negotiation patterns may differ according to varying channel structures ranging 
from a loose coalition of independently owned firms to a system integrated by 
ownership (Grabner and Rosenberg 1969). In parallel with a theoretical recognition 
of marketing as exchange, the realization is growing that exchange processes often 
involve relationships over time (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). 
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Because expected future interaction is a defining feature of relationships, 
parties may explicitly take into account a temporal dimension in negotiation (Polzer, 
Mannix, and Neale 1995). Individuals involved in long-term relationships are found 
to take different approaches toward conflicts from individuals in short-term 
relationships (e.g., Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984). In a long-term relationship, 
participants are more likely to focus on achieving future goals, since a future 
interaction is expected between the participants (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990). 
To the extent that a long-term relationship is sought, participants tend to search for 
mutually beneficial agreements (Walton and McKersie 1965). · Several empirical 
studies support the view that successive relational exchanges are expected to promote 
the use of more integrative mechanisms for conflict resolution (Kaufmann and Stem 
1988; Dant and Schul 1992; Ganesan 1993). 
Relational Norms. Norms are shared expectations regarding behavior {Thibaut 
and Kelley 1959). Negotiation, like most human enterprises, is heavily influenced by 
social norms (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). Norms regarding negotiation behavior, 
however, can differ greatly from one context to another (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). 
A critical contextual factor is the nature of relationship as discussed earlier. 
According to MacNeil (1980), various exchange types were distinguished in terms of 
the discrete or relational manifestations of the common contracting norms. Drawing 
on MacNeil's theory of relational exchange, Kaufmann and Stem (1988) formulated a 
model of conflict in commercial exchange relationships, focusing on the ways norms 
affect perceptions of unfair treatment during serious disputes. It was found, for 
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instance, that the contracting norm of solidarity caused parties to rely on trust and 
future cooperative intent, since this norm implied a continuous exchange relationship. 
Further in this line of thinking, Dant and Schul (1992) proposed and confirmed the 
hypothesized relationships between relational norms and choice of conflict resolution 
strategies in a field study involving franchisees in the fast food restaurant industry. 
In recognition that relational norms· or relationalism may be manifested in 
several different, though related, domains (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990), 
marketing scholars have recently examined the following relational norms: solidarity, 
role integrity, mutuality, relational focus, flexibility, restraint, information exchange, 
harmonization with the social matrix (Kaufmann and Stern 1988; Kaufmann and Dant 
1992; Heide and John 1992). Several of these relational norms such as flexibility 
have been considered as an alternative to legal forms of organizing transactions 
(Gundlach and Achrol 1993). 
Relationship Commitment. For the purpose of the current study, relationship 
commitment is defined as "an enduring desire to maintain a valued relationship" 
(Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992, p.316). When exchange partners are 
willing to continue their relationship, they will likely exhibit an explicit long-term 
orientation so that short-term sacrifice may be made to maintain the relationship 
(Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). 
The term commitment has been used in different ways. Consolidating prior 
conceptualizations, Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer (1995) proposed a model of 
commitment consisting of three components: (1) input or instrumental component, 
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affirmative actions such as idiosyncratic investments; (2) an attitudinal component; 
and (3) a temporal dimension, highlighting a consistent intention over time. 
Relationship commitment, as defined in the present study, corresponds to the prior 
authors' attitudinal component, denoting a partner's willingness to maintain and 
enhance the relationship. 
While relationship commitment is fairly new to inter-organizational study 
(Morgan and Hunt 1994), there has been evidence of its effect on inter-partner 
interaction and negotiation behavior. For instance, as commitment provides a 
foundation for the development of social norms of governance, committed parties tend 
to reach mutually satisfactory compromises and eschew resorting to formal procedures 
and third-party intervention in conflict resolution (Kaufmann and Stem 1988). 
Importantly, committed parties in the long-term, purposefully designed strategic 
alliances have to adopt negotiation approaches compatible with the nature of 
relationship (Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995). For example, since relationship 
commitment forecloses comparable exchange alternatives, partners are more likely to 
act adaptively in resolving conflict (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). 
Trust. Trust is an aspect of relationships that constitutes another important 
antecedent to the negotiation process (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). While trust has 
been conceptualized in different ways, there are two general approaches to trust in the 
literature: (1) a belief view, that considers trust as a belief that the party's word or 
promise is reliable and that a party will fulfil his obligations in exchange relationship 
(Blau 1964; Rotter 1967); and (2) a behavioral intention view, that treats trust as 
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willingness to rely on a partner (Zand 1972; Deutsch 1962). A recent study explicitly 
advocated the inclusion of both views of trust by emphasizing that there should be a 
behavioral intention component in the concept of trust (Moorman, Zaltman, and 
Deshpande 1992). Defining trust as "a willingness to rely on an exchange partner in 
whom one has confidence", these authors state: 
(B)oth belief and behavioral intention components must be present for trust to 
exist. Therefore, if one believes that a partner is trustworthy without being 
willing to rely on that partner, trust is limited. However, if one is willing to 
rely on a partner without holding a belief about that partner's trustworthiness, 
reliance may be more a function of power and control than trust (p.315). 
Prior research consistently supports the positive relationship between trust and 
partners' integrative negotiation behavior in the form of self-disclosures, information 
exchange, and cooperative problem-solving (Zand 1972; Pruitt 1981; Kimmel~ 
1980). Similarly observations are available in marketing literature. For example, 
trust is viewed as a determinant of the functionality of conflict between parties 
(Anderson and Narus 1984, 1990; Morgan and Hunt 1994) and general level of inter-
partner communications (Mohr and Nevin 1990). Trust also increases a partner's 
tolerance and flexibility in interaction process, since he/she has the confidence in 
reciprocatory actions from the other party (Niederkofler 1991). 
The "reliance on trust" perspective, as discussed earlier, highlights the possible 
role of trust with respect to structured mechanisms for guiding interaction behavior 
and for resolving disagreements in strategic alliances. For instance, by cultivating 
trust, interfirm relationships can be stable without creating special institutional 
mechanisms (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987), an 
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observation that challenges the transaction cost argument that long-term exchanges 
tend to rely on bonding investment to maintain stable (Williamson 1985). In fact, the 
necessity of a trusting environment often lies in the inability of legal governance 
approach in reducing uncertainty in ongoing relational exchanges (Gulati 1995). Due 
to the developmental nature of strategic alliances and ever-changing environments, for 
example, formal contracts can hardly spell out every contingency (Koot 1988). In 
addition, the use of legalistic measures may heighten the existing conflict and even 
lead to the dissolution of the partnership (Macaulay 1965; Frazier and Summers 
1984). Reflecting on such observations; Ring and Van de Ven (1994) conclude: 
Heavy reliance on trust, or a reputation for fair dealing, may, as we have 
noted, lead to a formal agreement defining a cooperative IOR (note: IOR 
denotes interorganizational relationships) that is unenforceable by resort to 
institutional guarantors (courts, arbitrators). Even when these are available, 
however, recourse to them typically leads the parties to end their relationship 
(Ouchi 1984). Thus, private ordering becomes the primary dispute-resolution 
mechanism in cooperative IORs (p.94-95). 
Power and Dependency. · Power is the capability one party has for affecting 
another party's decision- variables in a relationship (El-Ansary and Stem 1972) and 
one party's power is the other party's dependency (Bacharach and Lawler 1980). 
Power has been assigned high significance in negotiation process, since power is 
considered a property of a relationship itself. 
Power relationships may be symmetric or balanced, where both parties have 
the same capability for affecting the outcomes of the other; when the power 
relationship is asymmetric, one of the parties can control a range of outcomes greater 
than that controlled by the other. Depending on the nature of power relationships, 
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either bilateral involvement or unilateral attempts are more likely in a relationship 
(Stern, Bagozzi, and Dholakia 1977). It is believed that a firm's possession of power 
will encourage it to take advantage of the· other firm in order to gain a 
disproportionate share of rewards in exchange (Robicheaux and El-Ansary 1975). 
Under balanced power, the "usable" power of one party is held in check by the other 
party's equal power (Thibaut and Kelley 1959, p.107). For example, unbalanced 
power is found to induce the powerful party to engage in more demanding or coercive 
behavior, whereas a balance of power lea~s to coordinative approach from both 
parties (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Dwyer and Oh 1987; Frazier, Gill and Kale 1989). 
The aforementioned power-coercion approach linkage, however, does not hold 
in some other studies. As observed by Frazier and Summers (1986), dealer 
dependence (i.e., less power) is positively related to the manufacturer's use of 
noncoercive strategies and negatively to the use of coercive strategies. In a recent 
study, Ganesan (1993) found that, when a retailer has more power than a vendor, the 
retailer is not likely to use a problem-solving strategy. A possible explanation lies in 
the interaction between power and other relational contexts. In Ganesan's study, the 
use of power had a "relational exchange context", whereby the powerful party's 
desire to exploit its power through a coercive strategy is likely to be tempered by the 
concerns about possible future retaliation and shift in power distribution (p.187). 
Indeed, the restricted power use may be a fundamental change when 
companies enter long-term relationships. As Achrol (1991) states, strategic alliances 
will make less use of resource-based dependencies to obtain managing authority, but 
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more on norms of sharing and commitment based on trust. In their commitment-trust 
theory of relationship marketing, Morgan and Hunt (1994) claim that power should no 
longer be the central concept if one attempts to understand successful relational 
exchanges. 
Despite the preceding arguments, distribution and use of power still appears to 
be an important factor that affects ongoing interaction in long-term relationships 
(Harrigan and Newman 1990). Although strategic alliances are formed under 
cooperative arrangements, self-interests are inevitable since partners to a varying 
extent remain independent to one another. These self-interests lead to divergent 
positions in the operation of the alliance and necessitate ongoit).g negotiation between 
partners (Dabholkar, Johnston, and Cathey 1994). Since the possession of power 
provides a firm with a position of importance in a relationship, exercise of power 
remains a viable tool for securing favorable resolutions to disagreements. 
Summary 
The above review demonstrates the richness of existing negotiation literature. 
As exemplified in the prior categorizations of various negotiation approaches, a 
relatively comprehensive picture has been available. To complete this review, 
however, two major shortcomings of previous research should also be noted. First, 
the relational contexts of negotiation approaches have not been fully explored. 
Conceptually and intuitively, for example, relationship commitment should exert 
influence on participants' negotiation behavior; however, empirical investigations have 
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been scant. Additionally, although power has long been a central concept in 
negotiation research, studies that specifically examine power use in more enduring 
relationships are lacking. For example, it is not clear whether commitment based 
trust restrains the use of power in cooperative alliances (Harrigan and Newman 1990). 
A holistic account of the process of long-term relationships is needed that considers 
both power and cooperation-induced constructs (Thorelli 1986). 
Another persistent weakness of the research on negotiation is the lack of 
attention to the potential impact of national culture, perhaps the broadest social 
context within which negotiation may occur (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993; Carnevale 
1995). North American scholars, for example, have been challenged to validate their 
concepts and frameworks in other social settings (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; 
Campbell et al. 1988; Graham et al. 1988). This requirement is particularly crucial 
when attempts are made to apply these conceptual frameworks in cross-cultural 
contexts, since current models of inter-organizational negotiation may not represent 
the complexity of cross-cultural processes. 
National Culture and Negotiation Approach 
While prior negotiation research provides no systematic account of cultural 
variables, the information available in anecdotal and scholarly literature suggests that 
national culture should be used as an explanatory tool in the studies of negotiation. 
To obtain a thorough understanding of the culture-negotiation link, the following 
sections first examine the notion of national culture as defined in the existing 
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literature. Then, the influences of national culture are overviewed in terms of various 
negotiation stages. Following a review of prior efforts of dimensionalizing national 
culture, the cultural dimensions that might affect the choice of various negotiation 
approaches are discussed. 
National Culture Defined 
In spite of the allure of the notion of national culture as a theoretical variable 
in behavior analysis, a consensus on its definition has yet to be achieved. The 
existence of multiple definitions of culture is a result of divergent perspectives held by 
scholars in different research traditions, including anthropology, sociology, 
psychology, management and organization sciences. For example, culture has been 
narrowly defined as learned behavior patterns which are shared by a group of people 
(Bamouw 1963) or more comprehensively as consisting of patterns of thinking, 
feeling, behaving, and the results of behavior which condition further behavior 
(Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952). 
Culture as Shared Values. While culture may justifiably be defined in various 
ways, it is analytically more fruitful to distinguish the shared values and behavioral 
patterns (Adler and Doktor 1989). According to this view, culture consists of some 
fundamental values or beliefs that are shared by a group of people and assert 
influence on human behavior (Child 1981; Kluckhohn 1951). In other words, culture 
impacts behavior, but is not behavior itself. For example, Hofstede (1980) defines 
culture as "The collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members 
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of one human group from another" (p.25). If the key cultural values or collective 
minds that are universal across societies can be identified, different collectivities may 
be ordered along these dimensions and their way of behaving can 
be predicted accordingly (Kluckhohn and Strodbeck 1961; Hofstede 1980) .. 
Culture as Information Processing System. For the purpose of studying 
negotiation as an interaction mode, there is another practical viewpoint that national 
culture is a system for creating, sending, storing, and processing information evolved 
by human beings (Hall 1976). For example, depending on how information flows, 
cultures may be categorized into "high-context" and "low-context", with context 
denoting non-verbal aspects of communication. In a high-context culture, people are 
deeply involved with each other and simple messages with deep meaning flow freely. 
Conversely, in low-context cultures, there is relatively little involvement with people 
and messages used in communications are necessarily explicit (p.35). It is suggested 
that such variability in information processing/communication styles leads to different 
approaches in negotiation and conflict handling. For example, compared with 
members of low-context cultures (e.g., U.S.), members of high-context cultures (e.g., 
( 
Japan) are less likely to express their opinions openly. Instead they will hold a 
relatively indirect-inactive stance toward disagreements (Leung 1988; Ting-Toomey 
1988). 
Influence of National Culture on Negotiation 
Scholars in anthropology, sociology, organizational behavior, and particularly 
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social psychology have long been interested in the influence of national culture on 
negotiation. Their work can be organized around the four stages of negotiation 
process, as represented in Figure 3. 
First, national culture may influence participants' conceptualization of the 
situation. There seems to be no necessary relationship between the "objective" 
characteristics of the situation and a participant's conceptualization of the situation. 
Instead, the way a man defines his situation constitutes for him its reality (Allport 
1954). According to Rapoport (1960), !X)nflict is often grounded in misunderstanding 
and such misunderstanding is not merely factual disagreement nor is it simply a result 
of ambiguous communications. It may stem from basically different 
conceptualizations of reality held by the participants in negotiation. Yet a possible 
source of varying conceptions is cultural differences, as individuals' perceptions of 
issues related to negotiations are influenced by their cognitive frames that in tum are 
shaped by unique natural cultures (Lima ye and Victor 1991). 
Second, participants' cultural background may have a bearing on their 
preference for negotiation approaches. For example, a lasting theme in these 
disciplines is the linkage between negotiation/conflict styles and the cultural dimension 
of individualism-collectivism, although the empirical findings are inconsistent and 
sometimes confusing (e.g., Ting-Toomey 1988; Trubisky, Ting-Toomey, and Lin 
1991). 
In addition, national culture may affect a participant's interpretation of his/her 
opponent's actions during the interaction process. Several researchers have 
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questioned whether or not the U.S. -originated assumption regarding reciprocatory use 
of influence strategies will hold true in non-U.S. settings (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 
1989; Johnson et al. 1993). In a study of distribution channels involving Japanese 
distributors and U.S. manufacturers, for instance, the mediated and nonmediated 
bases of power found in U.S. settings are not replicated in Japanese distributors' 
perceptions (Johnson et al. 1993). 
Finally, participants' perceptive and affective responses to the negotiation 
outcomes may be different. Regarding the effectiveness of a specific negotiation 
episode, for example, participants of both sides may have rather different 
assessments, since organizations establish their criteria for effectiveness based on the 
dominant values operating in one's own culture (Sekaran and Snodgrass 1989). 
Outcomes of negotiation may also lead to different levels of satisfaction between 
participants of differing cultural backgrounds. In an IJV context, for example, 
cultural difference may lead to a low degree of agreement between partners regarding 
the venture's performance (Geringer and Hebert 1991). 
The effect of national culture on negotiations is often examined simply in 
terms of communicative difficulties between negotiators with dissimilar national 
culture backgrounds. Cultural variations in value,· attitude, and cognition may be 
represented by a summed term, cultural distance, since barriers in communications 
often increase when two countries are far apart culturally (Doz 1988; Davidson 1982). 
The manner by which cultural similarities/ differences affect negotiation behavior has 
been an understudied topic (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). However, tentative 
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propositions have been established. For example, as long as negotiation involves two-
way communications, it may be predicted that the more similar the cultures of 
participants, the less likely misunderstanding in communications will occur (Anderson 
and Weitz 1989). In addition, there is evidence that negotiators may behave 
differently when they are from the same culture than when they come from different 
cultures (Alder and Graham 1989). Finally, related to the cultural variation in 
collectivism versus individualism, negotiators from certain cultures (e.g. Hong Kong) 
seem more sensitive to ingroup/outgroup differences than others (Leung 1988). 
National Culture Dimensions 
In most studies that have considered the effect of national culture, the 
construct of individualism/collectivism has been treated as the dimension that best 
distinguishes national cultures. However, there are other cultural dimensions that also 
influence the negotiation process. As demonstrated in prior cross-cultural 
organization studies, a meaningful approach in research of national culture is to 
identify each. of these underlying cultural dimensions that exist across different 
cultures (Hofstede 1980). Enumerated by Kluckhohn and Strodbeck (1961, p.10), 
this approach is built on the following assumptions: 
1. There are a limited number of common human problems for which all 
peoples at all times must find some solution. 
2. There are a limited number of alternatives which exist for dealing with 
these problems. 
3. All alternatives are present in all societies at all times, but they are 
differentiately preferred. 
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4. Each society has a dominant profile of value orientations and in 
addition has numerous variant or substitute profiles. 
5. In both dominant and variant profiles there is a rank-ordering of 
preference for alternatives. 
Table 3 presents five major models of cultural dimensions that summarize 
prior scholarly efforts of dimensionalizing national culture. 
Parsons and Shils (1951) posit five "pattern variables" as determinants of all 
"human action". A pattern variable is defined as "a dichotomy, one side of which 
must be chosen by an actor before the meaning of a situation is determinate for him, 
and thus before he can act with respect to that situation" (p. 77). It is postulated that 
these choices are present at the individual level (personality), the social system level 
(group), and the cultural level (normative). For instance, concerning the dilemma of 
gratification of impulse versus disciplines, affectivity can be exhibited as a need-
disposition, a role-expectation, or a normative pattern in terms of taking advantage of 
a given opportunity for immediate gratification without regard to evaluative 
considerations (p.80). A major effort is thus made to integrate the cultural, the 
social, and the individual level of analysis into a general theory of the social system 
based on the value-orientation pattern variables. 
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TABLE 3 
MODELS OF NATIONAL CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 
Disciplines Authors Dimensions 
Sociology Parsons & Shils Affectivity versus Affective Neutrality 
(1951) Self versus Collectivity 
Universalism versus Particularism 
Ascription versus Achievement 
Specificity versus Diffuseness 
Anthropology Kluckhohn& Man and Nature 
Strodbeck Man and Himself 
(1961) Relationship between Humans 
Time 
Human Activity 
Social Psychology Inkeles & Relation to Authority 
Levinson Conception of Self 
(1969) Primary Dilemmas of Conflict 
Organization Study Hofstede Individualism 
(1980) Power Distance 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Masculinity 
Cross-cultural Chinese Culture Moral discipline 
Psychology Connection Integration 
(1987) Human Heartedness 
Confucian Work Dynamics 
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Kluckhohn and Strodbeck (1961) examine five value-orientations, defined as 
patterned principles "which give order and direction to the ever-flowing· stream of 
human acts and thoughts as these relate to the solution of 'common human' problems" 
(p.4). Specifically, every culture must find a solution to each of the five problems 
regarding (1) relationship between human and nature; (2) innate human nature; (3) 
relationship between humans; (4) temporal focus of human life; and (5) modality of 
human activity. According to their empirical investigations among five different rural 
and cultural communities of the American Southwest, the two authors demonstrate 
that it is possible to study the value orientation of a culture through the testing of 
individuals. 
Inkeles and Levinson (1969) propose three standard analytic issues for the 
comparative analysis of "national character" or "modal personality". They ask: "To 
what extent do the patterned conditions of life in a particular society give rise to 
certain distinctive patterns in the personalities of its members?" (p.418) The three 
standard analytic issues are chosen based on two criteria: (1) universal to human 
societies; and (2) functional significant for both individual and social system. They 
believe, for instance, that modef personality may be described in terms of one or a 
few primary dilemmas, such as those proposed by Erikson (1950) in his formulation 
of stages in ego development (e.g., trust versus distrust). To the extent that the 
dilemma remains unresolved, it has various consequences for the individual's further 
characteristics (p.452). 
An important progress in the area is the work of Hofstede (1980) based on a 
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research project across 53 countries. Hofstede identifies four main dimensions along 
which dominant value systems can be ordered and which affect human thinking and 
organiz.ations in predictable ways. Specifically, power distance describes the 
relationship between superior and subordinate in a hierarchy; individualism is a 
measure of individuals' relations to group or organization; uncertainty avoidance 
concerns the extent to which a person feels comfortable in an unstructured situation; 
and finally, masculinity deals with genders' role in organiz.ations. By locating 
cultures on a four-factor map, Hofstede's seminal work has allowed for comparison of 
cultures on an a priori basis (Gudykunst, Yang, and Nishida 1985). 
A more recent effort was made by the Chinese Culture Connection (1987) to 
. . 
identify some "culture-free"--cultural dimensions. To develop an· initial item pool, a 
number of Chinese social scientists were -asked to prepare a list of basic values for 
Chinese people. The resultant 40-item "Chinese Value Survey" (CVS) was 
administered to college students in a variety of disciplines in 22 countries. A 
statistical analysis of the survey results yielded four cultural factors. Three factors 
were shown to have_ significant correlations with three dimensions of Hofstede' s 
(1980), while the dimension of uncertainty avoidance was missing in the CVS data. 
On the other hand, the study revealed another clearly marked dimension, whose 
positive pole reflected a dynamic, future-oriented mentality, originated from 
Confucius' ideas. This dimension was named "Confucian Dynamism". 
It should be noted that these classifications bear many similarities (Hofstede 
1980; Hofstede and Bond 1988). A salient example is the individualism-collectivism 
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dimension: its primary concern -- an individual's relationship with his/her group --
appears in all the five classifications, although different terminologies are used3• 
Cultural Dimensions and Negotiation Aru,roach 
While the culture dimensions summarized in Table 3 all relate to fundamental 
problems of humanity, they are not equally influential in various facets of human 
experience. Four national culture dimensions appear to have a significant bearing on 
negotiation behavior: These dimensions include collectivism, ambiguity tolerance, 
humanism, and long-term orientation. Table 4 presents the domain definitions of the 
four cultural dimensions. The following discussions deal with each of the dimensions 
with respect to their negotiation relevance and cultural variation along these 
dimensions. 
TABLE 4 
CULTURAL DIMENSIONS RELATED TO NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 
Cultural Dimension Domain 
Collectivism Relationship between individual and his/her group. 
Ambiguity Tolerance Attitude toward unstructured situations. 
Humanism Perceived importance of human factors in management processes. 
Long-term Orientation Time horizon allowed for gratification/reciprocity. 
3• These include Hofstede's (1980) "individualism" dimension, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's (1961) 
"relational orientation•, Parsons and Shils' ( 1951) • self orientation versus collective orientation•, 




A review of the multidisciplinary literature reveals a fundamental cultural 
dimension that relates to negotiation and conflict behavior -- collectivism, which 
concerns the relationship between individual and his group (Gudykunst 1988; Ting-
Toomey 1988). Depending on whether people belong to a collectivist culture or its 
antithesis, an individualistic culture, they will exhibit variance in terms of sense of 
interdependency, attitude toward group goals, and concerns with relational harmony 
(see Triandis 1986 for a review). 
It is widely thought that in collectivist societies, people believe in 
interdependency among group members and stress group goals over individual goals. 
Therefore, they view harmonious relationship within the group as a prominent 
principle. In contrast, people in individualistic societies stress independence or self-
reliance, look after themselves and their immediate family only, and have less 
concern about face and social harmony (Hsu 1985; Triandis 1986; Hofstede 1980; 
Hofstede and Bond 1988; Ting-Toomey 1988). While face saving or maintenance is a 
universal phenoinenon in social interaction (Goffman 1967), some cultures 
demonstrate greater concern. about saving face than others because of their 
fundamental group consciousness. In individualistic societies, face maintenance is a 
matter of communicative competence, whereas in collectivist societies, people strive 
to save face by obtaining favorable comments from one's group (Hu 1944). 
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National Difference in Collectivism. Considerable evidence has accumulated 
to support the usefulness of collectivism as a way of categorizing cultures (Hofstede 
1980). In particular, the American culture is found to be highly individualistic, 
whereas the Chinese culture is collective oriented (Hofstede 1980; Chinese Culture 
Connection 1987). For instance, the Chinese are found to stress interdependency 
among group members (and even between group members and outside contingencies), 
to emphasize group interests and conformity, to promote harmony within groups, and 
to be sensitive to face and group pressure. Even in post-Mao mainland China, 
collectivism remains a fundamental premise that governs other cultural assumptions 
(Nevis 1983). In contrast, the Americans are individual-centered, achievement-
driven, and extremely competitive (Hsu 1985; Hu 1944; Adler and Jelinek 1986). As 
a result, Chinese managers tend to run business as a family, to promote networks with 
outside contingencies, and to maintain internal harmony (Redding 1990). Conversely, 
American managers would insist on rational decision making, believe in independent 
enterprise, and endorse frankness in internal communication (Newman 1972). 
Collectivism and Negotiation Awroach. The cultural· dimension of 
collectivism affects the overall conflict negotiation process as well as the specific 
conflict and negotiation styles (Triandis et al. 1988). Most of the prior studies hold 
the following proposition: members of collectivist cultures are likely to use more 
obliging/smoothing and avoidance-oriented approaches, whereas members of 
.. individualistic cultures tend to use a greater degree of dominating/controlling and 
solution-oriented approaches (ring-Toomey 1988; Ting-Toomey, Trubisky, and 
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Nishida 1989). Since members of collectivist cultures strive to maintain relational 
harmony, they are less likely to take dominate stance (forcing) toward negotiation, but 
more likely to seek a middle ground (compromising) between conflicting positions. 
Also, because collectivism implies certain degree of passivity (Sakara.n and Snodgrass 
1989), it does not fit the confrontational, assertive tone of the problem-solving 
approach. In comparison, cultures low on collectivism (i.e., individualism) stress 
initiation and fact-based decision making, so that their members are more likely to 
endorse such a solution-oriented negotiation approach (Trubisky, Ting-Toomey, and 
Lin 1991; Westwood, Tang, and Kirkbride 1992; Chiu and Kosinski 1993). 
A unique effect of the collectivism dimension on negotiation behavior has been 
examined in terms of ingroup-outgroup4 communication. Since collectivist cultures 
stress group goals over individual goals, collectivism is associated with a heightened 
ingroup-outgroup distinction (Leung and Bond 1984). Consequently, the greater the 
degree of collectivism present in a culture, the greater the differences in ingroup and 
outgroup communication (Gudykunst et al. 1992; Gudykunst, Yoon, and Nishida 
1987). In other words, members of collectivist cultures are more likely to take 
different negotiation approaches depending upon whether the other party is an ingroup 
member or a stranger. For example, it is found that Chinese subjects were less likely 
to pursue a conflict with an ingroup disputant and more likely to pursue a conflict 
with an outgroup disputant than were Americans (Leung 1988). 
4• The terms "ingroup" and "outgroup" are used to describe group membership. In different circumstances, 
ingroup members are the members of a particular group (e.g., a country or an organization), whereas 
outgroup members are anyone who does not belong to that group. 
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Tolerance of Ambie;uity5 
Another relevant cultural dimension, tolerance of ambiguity, indicates "to what 
extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in 
unstructured situations" (Hofstede and Bond 1988, p.11). Structured situations are 
those in which there are clear rules to follow (Hofstede 1991). The cultural 
orientation regarding ambiguity exerts a major impact on people's attitudes toward 
principles, rules, interpersonal relations, and "deviant" behavior (Gudykunst 
1988). 
Cultural Difference in Ambiguity Tolerance. The psychology literature treats 
tolerance of ambiguity as a generalized personality variable (Frenkel-Brunswik 1949), 
but cultures also differ with regard to the scope they allow for the ambiguities . (Levine 
1985). For instance, ambiguous expressions in speech and ~ought are popular in 
many Asian and African societies, serving "a number of social and cultural purposes" 
(id., p.24). In Hofstede's (1980) classic cross-cultural research, the Americans score 
much higher than the Hong Kong Chinese on the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension. 
While the American culture pursues a single Truth, the Chinese culture, summarized 
in Confucius' teachings, offers various ways in which one can improve him/herself 
but these do not consist in believing in a Truth (Hofstede 1991). The Chinese 
therefore allow more ambiguity in "situations" than the Americans do (Hsu 1985). 
5 • It may be worth noting that many authors do not make distinction between ambiguity 
tolerance and risk-taking propensity. While the former concerns the attitude toward unstructured 
situations, the latter measures the tendency toward risky conditions. 
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The Japanese, whose culture is also influenced heavily by Confucianism, provide 
another case for illustrating cultural difference in ambiguity tolerance. While the 
Western mind has a tradition which pursues specificity and decisiveness (Northrop 
1959), the Japanese are characterized with "indeterminateness", which assigns less 
value to abstract and universal principles (Peterson and Shimada 1978). Due to such 
a fundamental difference, cultures may attach different connotations to ambiguity. 
For example, the Americans afford little room for the cultivation of ambiguity 
(Levine 1985), since an ambiguous situation implies incompleteness, unstableness, and 
needs clearing up (Pascale and Athos 1981). 
Situational Flexibility versus Rule Orientation. Attitude toward ambiguity 
affects managerial assumption with respect to rules, regulations, and organizational 
structures. Mirrored. in rule-oriented modern organizations, cultures low in ambiguity 
tolerance prefer explicit rules and regulation, and complex organizational structures to 
safeguard against the unknown future of the organization (Hofstede 1980). In 
addition, long-range planning and transparent information flows within organizations 
are more likely to be used as ambiguity reduction mechanisms (Seka.ran and 
Snodgrass 1989). According to Redding (1990), informal, intuitive styles of decision 
making are popular in overseas Chinese businesses. Similarly, Hsu (1985) considers 
situation orientation, flexibility regarding rules and principles, as a unique Chinese 
character. Evidently, these are manifestations of the Chinese culture's high degree of 
tolerance for ambiguity (Levine 1985). In comparison, Americans tend to believe in 
"one truth" or universal principles and behave in a very legalistic manner (Pye 1982). 
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Ambiguity Tolerance and Negotiation Approach. Tolerance or avoidance of 
ambiguity has an impact on communication and negotiation behaviors. For example, 
the dominant American temper calls for clear and direct communications, whereas 
cultures in many Asian nations encourage vague and indirect communications (Hall 
1976). Relatedly, Americans opt for direct and open approaches in conflict 
management processes more than their Chinese counterparts (Ting-Toomey, Trubisky, 
and Nishida 1989). Ambiguity tolerance seems directly related the preference for 
compromise approach in negotiation6• For instance, the observation that the Chinese 
use more compromising than their American counterparts in negotiation appears 
supportive of the proposition that members of weak ambiguity-avoidance cultures will 
tend to compromise more in negotiation (Kale and McIntyre 1991). A more direct 
effect of the ambiguity tolerance dimension is found in different cultures' attitudes 
toward the use of legalistic approach in negotiation process. Explicit, detailed 
contractual documents as an important measure for uncertainty reduction, for 
example, are more intensively used by American partners in their alliances with the 
Japanese, who are more likely to see some desirable aspects in ambiguous 
relationships (Pascale and Athos 1981). 
Humanism 
The cultural dimension of humanism/human-neutrality measures the extent to 
6• Reference may be made to sociai psychology studies on closed-mindedness or dogmatism. For 
example, Druckman (1967) found that subjects high in dogmatism (i.e., low in ambiguity tolerance) 
viewed compromise as defeat more often than those who were low in dogmatism. 
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which human contexts are concerned in social processes (Yum 1988). A culture of 
humanism pursues trusting human relationships, relies on human feelings in making 
judgment, and emphasizes interpersonal relationships in social encounters. On the 
other hand, a culture of human-neutrality relies on rationality in decision making, 
concerns more about objectives of human actions, and refutes the interference of 
human affection in reasoning. 
Evidence from behavior sciences shows that cultures can be plotted on a 
continuous line, with countries such as Switzerland and Germany being the extreme of 
human-neutrality and Japan and China being the extreme of humanism. As Hall 
(1976) describes, Swiss and German are fragmented and somewhat alienated with 
little involvement with people, whereas Japanese and China are driven toward close, 
warm, friendly, involved side of life. American culture is considered to be close to 
the human-neutrality end. 
Reliance on Trust. Cultures differ in the perceived significance of human 
affection and trust (Ouchi 1980; Shane 1992). Although people in the world may 
construe trust in much the same way, members of some cultures, such as the Chinese, 
are more serious in relying on trust in exchange relationships (Redding 1995). In a 
study involving Japanese-American joint ventures, American managers are found not 
to have the same concern for trust as the Japanese (Sullivan et al. 1981). 
Trust, as social-psychological bond of sentiments and friendships, is produced 
through interpersonal interaction (Homans 1961). Therefore, to build a trusting 
relationship involves establishing and sustaining good personal relationships (Hazama 
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1978). However, different cultures do not appreciate such interpersonal relationships 
to the same degree, especially with regard to business conducts. People from some 
societies, such as Japan and China, consider such relationships as a precondition to 
fruitful businesses, while others such as a Westerner may be frustrated by being 
forced to engage in personal relations in a business setting (Pye 1982). 
The above discussion can help understand the striking difference between 
Americans and Chinese in their attitudes toward legalistic approach in negotiation. 
Since the legalistic approach is characterized with objectivity and rationality, it leaves 
no room for human affection. Such an approach, in consequence, is not favored by 
those cultures high in humanism, but more likely to be popular in cultures that rely 
less on human trust. Trust is said to offer an effective substitute to law as a basis of 
contracting in Japan (Smitka 1994). Similarly, since the Chinese are less trustful of 
laws than of personal contacts, they perceive resort to legal measures for resolving 
disagreement as failure of a relationship (Chen 1993). 
Context of Communication. The essence of humanism is natural human 
feelings for others, as reflected in various approaches in social interactions 
(McNaughton 1974). A major aspect of humanist cultures is that their members pay 
much attention to the uncoded messages of communication. These messages, or 
"context" in Hall's (1976) terminology, are the background information critical to 
interpersonal interaction, such as human relationship and social status. Because of 
this, members of humanist cultures are not likely to express their opinions openly and 
act on them publicly. Members of humanist-neutral cultures, on the other hand, 
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appreciate openness and directness with little concern about hidden context. For 
example, American methods of communication are customarily very direct and to the 
point, whereas the Orientals tend toward indirectness in communication and believe 
that directness may harm human relationships (Hall 1976; Chiu and Kosinski 1993). 
Thus, in a joint venture context, the U.S. manager, who is used to seeking out and 
dealing with the facts, may find that this problem-solving approach is perceived by his 
Chinese counterpart as showing dislikes or an attempt to block the other's progress 
(Newman 1992)! 
Long-term Orientation 
The final cultural dimension of concern to this research relates to time, that is, 
the cultural disposition toward shorter or longer time horizon within which 
gratification and reciprocity are allowed to be deferred. While this conceptualization 
of time orientation is extended from a psychological trait -- delay for gratification, as 
a national culture dimension; it is more about "virtue": values oriented towards the 
future, such as perseverance, and values oriented towards the past and present, such 
as fulfilling social obligations (Hofstede 1991). 
Delay for Gratification and Reciprocity. Time preference refers to the degree 
to which a person consistently is engaged in and attaches importance to different time 
zones (past, present, and. future). An individual is considered as holding a long-term 
(future) orientation ifs/he is relatively tolerant of gratification delay (Mischel 1974). 
For parties involved in long-term relationships, time orientation may affect their 
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negotiation stance, since such a relationship often requires parties to postpone 
temporarily the receipt of their own outcomes until some later time (Anderson and 
Narus 1990). For example, when a retailer is long-term oriented, integrated 
negotiation approaches such as problem-solving are more likely to be used for 
resolving conflicts with his/her vendor partner (Ganesan 1993). 
Furthermore, since delayed reinforcements in an exchange are delivered by the 
other party, a future orientation not only· refers to the ability to delay gratification per 
se, but relates to the norm of reciprocity. As reciprocity often involves a chain of 
counteracts, its balance has to be maintained in a long run (Malinowski 1932). If a 
party attaches more importance to the long-term profitable relationship with the other 
party, s/he would allow asymmetrical reciprocity in the short run. In other words, 
when the parties are long-term oriented, "there may be a lesser need for strict-
reciprocity accounting in that the future holds ample opportunity for and expectations 
of balancing" (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). From this viewpoint, relational 
contracts are just a way of trading off the short term loss involved in sacrificing 
certain advantage against the insurance of future help from a trading partner (Dore 
1983). 
Cultural Variation in Time Orientation. As a cultural value orientation, time 
perspective is shaped by national culture as well as environmental factors (Kluckhohn 
and Strodbeck 1961; Hall 1959). Previous studies suggest that Asians, including the 
Chinese, may have a longer time horizon due to their inter-generational view of life. 
In contrast, individualistic cultures place greater emphasis on goals and needs of each 
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individual, whose time horizon, therefore, is rather limited (West 1989; Tse~ 
1988). While reciprocity is seen as a universal norm, its function may vary in 
different cultures (Gouldner 1960; Hall 1959). For example, in Eastern Asia, the 
Confucian principle of mutual faithfulness views relationships as reciprocally 
obligatory, which is the antithesis of immediate personal profits (Yum 1988). In 
contrast, in "the most rationalized" United States, this tendency is weaker (Gouldner 
1960). These observations are supported by the findings of a large-scale cross-
cultural research, in which the Chinese scored highest on the Long-term Orientation 
dimension, whereas the Americans were among the lowest (Chinese Culture 
Connection 1987; Hofstede 19917). 
Time Orientation and Negotiation Agproach. The cultural dimension of time 
orientation has been recognized for its impact on negotiation behavior. For instance, 
immediate reciprocity is considered as one characteristic of the American negotiation 
approach, in contrast to long-term reciprocity of the Japanese negotiation approach 
(Graham and Sano 1989). Similarly, comparing with their American counterparts, 
the Chinese are found to be more concerned with long-term associations at the 
negotiation table {Tung 1982). Particularly, the Chinese' long-term orientation exerts 
influence on their preference for compromising approach. Under the Chinese' system 
of reciprocity, people do not calculate what they give and receive at any given 
7• The dimension was called Confucian Dynamism in the Chinese Culture Connection's study and 
renamed by Hofstede as Long-term versus Short-term Orientation. 
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moment (Yum 1988); rather, they are always ready to make concessions to the extent 
that sustaining the relationship necessities a compromise. 
Sum mazy 
Cultural Dimensions Relevant to Negotiation. As a long-standing interest to 
scholars in anthropology, sociology, and social psychology, national culture and its 
effect on human behaviors have been extensively researched. Particularly, cross-
cultural negotiations and conflict behavior have been a growing area of inquiry. 
Previous research, however, has not been notably successful in taking advantage of 
incorporating national culture into the study of negotiation (Gulliver 1988). One 
shortcoming of this effort has b~n a failure to identify specific cultural dimensions 
that are relevant to negotiation behavior. To date only the dimension of collectivism 
has received due attention. 
A synthesis of extant accounts of national culture in both anecdotal and 
scholarly literature revealed four cultural dimensions that exert influence on human 
behavior in negotiation: ambiguity tolerance, humanism, long-term orientation, as 
well as collectivism. By doing so, more fruitful inquiry into the culture-negotiation 
behavior link can be facilitated. 
National Culture as Theoretical Variable. Past research also has failed to 
place national culture in a systemic framework that simultaneously examines various 
crucial variables that collectively constitute a contextual condition of negotiation 
process. Despite the wide recognition of role- of cultural contexts in negotiation 
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processes, the magnitude of such an effect is far from clear. Can national culture 
alter fundamental processes of negotiation, or does it only moderate the linkages 
between more critical contextual variables and negotiation processes? While some of 
the recent studies in social psychology tended to treat national culture as the 
predicting variable, others casted doubts on such a stance (Brehmer and Hammond 
1977; Gulliver 1988). Without proper conceptualization on the role of national 
culture, inconsistent evidence will be further delivered by empirical investigations. 
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CHAPTER ill 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
The previous chapter reviewed and integrated the extant literature on 
negotiation theories and on national culture with respect to negotiation behavior. 
Studies of negotiation have accumulated substantive knowledge about how sociaj. units 
interact to achieve agreement from each other's conflicting positions. This invaluable 
academic heritage has yet to be fully appreciated by those conducting research on 
relationship processes within strategic alliances. Two research areas needing further 
study have been identified. First, the relational variables, which provide a 
fundamental context of the negotiation process, have not been sufficiently explored in 
the existing literature. This lack of attention to the relational context largely results 
from relative ignorance of the ongoing processes of long-term business relationships. 
Second, national culture has not been successfully incorporated into theory-building, 
although strategic alliances often involve partners of different national origins and 
each partner brings different.cultural schemata to the negotiation table (Reardon and 
Spekman 1994). 
This study attempts to advance our knowledge about the linkage between 
relational contexts and negotiation behavior, using a typical case of strategic 
alliances -- international joint ventures (UVs). The study setting involves partners 
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with contrasting cultural backgrounds, which allows the examination of the effect of 
identified cultural dimensions on the partners' negotiation approach. Two specific 
questions addressed by the research are: 
1. To what degree do three relational contextual variables -- relationship 
commitment, trust, and relative power -- influence joint venture 
partners' adoption of different negotiation approaches? 
2. To what degree does variation in national culture moderate the linkages 
between relational contexts and negotiation behavior? 
Research Hypotheses 
Given the research questions noted above, three sets of variables are examined 
in the study. These are relational context, negotiation approach, and national culture. 
Figure 6 graphically summarizes the conceptual model upon which research 
hypotheses are based. Negotiation approaches are predicted by relational context 
variables and the relationship is moderated by national culture. 
/ ' / ' Relational Context Negotiation Approach 
- Relationship - Problem-Solving 
Commitment 
~ 
- Compromising ,_. 
h 
- Trust - Forcing 
- Relative Power - Legal Recourse 
' \. 
National Culture 
Figure 6. Conceptual Model of Relationships between Negotiation Approach, 
Relational Context, and National Culture. 
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Negotiation Awroaches 
The macro-processes perspective, as reviewed in the previous chapter, 
emphasizes that negotiation is a unique mode of interaction often involving 
longitudinal process and covering wide-range social contexts (Guetzkow 1977). As 
one of many mechanisms for resolving· social conflicts, negotiation is characterized by 
participants' explicit intent to reach an agreement. While prior research has identified 
many different negotiation approaches, there is evidence that these approaches may 
not be equally relevant in different settings (Perdue arid Summers 1991). Pilot 
interviews with joint venture managers and the literature review have revealed four 
negotiation approaches that are commonly used by joint venture partners. These 
negotiation approaches include problem-solving, compromising, forcing, and legal 
recourse. Accordingly, negotiation approaches, the criterion variable for the research 
0 
hypotheses to be developed in the current study, will be operationalized by these four 
approaches~ 
Relational Context of Negotiation 
Negotiation behavior is conditio11:~ by_ the context within which negotiation 
occurs. The basic perspective from which inter-organizational ongoing negotiation 
will be investigated is that of relational context. This perspective holds that in order 
to understand negotiation phenomena, one needs to take into account the impact of 
relational contextual conditions within which such phenomena are inevitably 
embedded (Kramer and Messick 1995; Greenhalgh and Chapman 1995). Particularly, 
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participants' preferences for different negotiation approaches are posited to be 
influenced by various relational factors. 
The previous chapter examines five dimensions of relational context: 
relationship longevity; relational norms; relationship commitment; trust; and relative 
power. The study incorporates three of these dimensions as predictor variables {see 
Figure 6). Longevity of relationship, which is not included in the main study, may be 
used as a moderating variable in later research. Relational norms are excluded mainly 
for concerns with operational problems. For example, some identified relational 
norms, Such as "solidarity" {Kaufmann and Stern 1988), overlap the domain of 
relationship commitment, while others, such as "harmonization of conflict" 
{Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995), appear to confound actual negotiation 
approaches. Consequently, only relationship commitment, trust, and relative power 
will be investigated within this study. 
Negotiation Approaches and Relational Context 
The previous chapter discussed the conceptual and empirical evidence in 
support of the relationships between four negotiation approaches and three dimensions 
of relational context. Based on the proposed relationships, a number of hypotheses 
are established. 
Problem-Solving. Problem-solving is evident when the participants openly 
exchange information about goals and priorities and continually evoke new 
alternatives in search for agreement. This negotiation approach represents an 
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integrative orientation, since the parties bear a concern with both self and the other 
party. As such, when a party is willing to maintain and nourish a relationship, s/he is 
likely to adopt a problem-solving approach toward disagreement resolution. Use of 
problem-solving is also more likely when trust is high, since trust encourage openness 
in information exchange and self-disclosures (Pruitt 1981). Conversely, power 
asymmetry provides a condition in which communication frequency "would be 
inversely proportional to the relative power" (Dwyer and Walker 1981, p.110). 
Based on the evidence provided in the previous chapter, the following hypotheses are 
offered: 
Hla. Problem-Solving is positively related to Relationship Commitment. 
Hlb. Problem-Solving is positively related to Trust. 
Hlc. Problem-Solving is inversely related to Relative Power. 
Compromising. Compromising is observed where participants seek a middle 
ground between their initial divergent positions. By making concessions on some 
issue(s), resolutions are more likely to be reached without threatening existing 
relationships between the participants. For this reason, the compromising approach is 
often preferred by a committed party as long as s/he considers preserving partnership 
as necessitating the act of concession. Also, a party is more likely to adopt the 
compromising approach when s/he trusts the other party's desire to reciprocate (Pruitt 
and Lewis 1977). The effect of relative power is an inverse relationship. In general, 
unbalanced power tends to encourage the powerful party to engage in less concession-
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making, while a power-balance condition is more likely to induce compromise among 
participants (Rahim 1983). These discussions can be summarized in the following 
hypotheses: 
H2a. Compromising is positively related to Relationship Commitment. 
H2b. Compromising is positively related to Trust. 
H2c. Compromising is inversely related to Relative Power. 
Forcing. Forcing is to use power in making the other party comply. In 
search for resolutions to disagreement, one party attempts to win its own concern at 
the other party's expense. Perceivably, such a self-interest-seeking approach is less 
likely to be taken by a party who assigns importance to the relationship with the other 
party. Additionally, use of a forcing approach seems related to the degree of trust. 
Competitive behavior often represents a defensive reaction to a sense of threat in 
negotiation (Pruitt and Lewis 1977). For example, when multinationals have no 
confidence in local partners, they prefer a dominant equity position so as to secure 
favorable resolutions to unforeseen conflicts in UVs (Friedmann and Beguin 1971). 
Finally, there is a direct link between relative power and use of the forcing approach. 
In an imbalanced power condition, parties have a tendency toward exercising their 
power (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Dwyer and Walker 1981). Stated in formal 
fashion, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H3a. Forcing is inversely related to Relationship Commitment. 
H3b. Forcing is inversely related to Trust. 
H3c. Forcing is positively related to Relative Power. 
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Legal Recourse. When a party appeals to a formal legal agreement to gain 
compliance, s/he is using legal recourse. Along with promises, threats, and requests, 
legal recourse is considered as being of "mediated" or "coercive" nature (Frazier and 
Summers 1984; Frazier and Summers 1986). It differs from the forcing approach in 
that the source for gaining compliance is a mutually agreed legal ground, rather than 
some unilateral power sources (e.g., equity position). However, such a legal stance 
may lead to ill will so as to threaten future relationships. Hence, when a relationship 
is highly valued, the committed party will use legal recourse only as the last resort. 
The legalistic approach will also- be avoided when a party has high trust toward the 
other party. As proposed in previous research, high reliance on trust gives rise to 
preference for conferral to legal recourse in conflict resolution. 
H4a. Legal recourse is inversely related to Relationship Commitment. 
H4b. Legal recourse is inversely related to Trust. 
To summarize, itis hypothesized that each of the relational variables is linked 
to various negotiation approaches. The hypothesized relationships are summarized in 
Table 5. No hypothesis is established to predict the linkage between legal recourse 
and relative power, since such speculation lacks grounding. Based upon research 
reviewed in the previous chapter, the use of problem-solving and compromising is 
suggested to be positively related to a partner's degree of relationship commitment 
and trust toward the other partner, but negatively related to relative power. 
Conversely, the use of forcing approach is expected to be negatively related to 
relationship commitment and trust, but positively related to relative power. 
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Additionally, since legal recourse may appear insulting and signal distrust to the other 
party, it is expected that the use of this approach will be negatively related to 
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A basic premise of the present study is that national culture exerts influence on 
negotiation behavior. For purpose of the current study, national culture is 
operationalized by the respondent's native culture. Four dimensions of national 
culture are examined: collectivism, ambiguity tolerance, humanism, and long-term 
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orientation. It is felt that each of these dimensions affects the preference for 
negotiation approaches. Based on the discussions in the previous chapter, the 
American and Chinese cultures provide substantive differences in culture over these 
dimensions. Table 6 indicates the differences between the two cultures. 
TABLE 6 
CONTRAST OF AMERICAN AND CHINESE CULTURES 
















In examining national culture's effect on negotiation approach, this study treats 
national culture as a "quasi moderator", which is a predictor variable and enters the 
equation through an interaction term (Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie 1981). Recall 
that in Chapter II, conceptual and empirical evidence was presented for how culture 
dimensions might influence the preference for negotiation approach. Because of its 
direct relationship with the choice of negotiation approach, national culture could be 
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treated as a predictor variable itself. For instance, members of collectivist cultures 
tend to opt for non-confrontational approaches to negotiation to a greater extent than 
members of individualistic cultures do (Leung 1988). However, since relational 
variables are considered as being more fundamental in ongoing negotiation, national 
culture is posited as a moderating variable. In other words, it will be examined for 
its interaction effect with the relational variables. For example, since collectivism is 
associated with heightened ingroup-outgroup distinction (Leung and Bond 1984; 
Triandis 1986), the link between relationship commitment and the use of problem-
solving approach may be altered to varying degree depending on whether the 
participant is a member of collectivist culture or individualistic culture. Hypotheses 
that conceptualize the national culture's moderating effects are offered below: 
National Culture, Problem-Solving and Relational Variables. Due to the effect 
of culture on communication within group relationships, when levels of commitment 
increase, Americans' use of Problem-Solving would not increase as much as Chinese' 
use of the negotiation approach. Based on Gudykunst and colleagues (Gudykunst, 
Yoon, and Nishida 1987; Gudykunst et al. 1992), the greater the degree of 
collectivism present in a culture, the greater the difference in ingroup and outgroup 
communication. When joint venture partners, either the American or Chinese, 
become increasingly committed to a relationship, the sense of ingroup membership 
should be enhanced accordingly. However, such an enhanced ingroup relationship 
will not lead to as much behavioral change among the American as among the 
Chinese partners, since the Americans, members of a highly individualistic culture, 
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behave largely according to internal mechanisms, rather than ingroup norms, goals, 
and values (friandis 1990). 
The Chinese culture's high reliance on trust appears to make the positive 
association between Trust and Problem-Solving stronger for Chinese. While people 
in high-context cultures (e.g., Chinese) are more cautious concerning self-disclosure 
and information exchange with strangers than are people in low-context cultures (e.g., 
Americans), such a difference would diminish when confidence develops among 
participants with increased interaction (Gudykunst 1983). 
When a party's power position is enhanced, s/he is more likely to become 
more coercive in negotiation approach but less likely to actively search for solutions 
that integrate the requirement of both parties. This tendency toward avoiding 
Problem-Solving in negotiation results from the pursuit for immediate maximum self-
gain (Dwyer and Walker 1981). Hla was built upon these assumptions. However, 
these assumptions largely reflect the typical situation in the Western world. In a non-
Western culture, where people underestimate the value of immediate gain due to their 
longer time orientation and heightened concern for collective goals, they would not be 
so sensitive to the change in power balance as to alter their use of the Problem-
Solving approach. And this is the case of the Chinese culture. 
To test the above predictions, we examine the following hypotheses: 
H5a. The positive relationship between Problem-Solving and Relationship 
Commitment is stronger for Chinese than for Americans. 
H5b. The positive relationship between Problem-Solving and Trust is 
stronger for Chinese than for Americans. 
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H5c. The inverse relationship between Problem-Solving and Relative Power 
is stronger for American than for Chinese. 
National Culture, Compromise and Relational Variables. Generally, when 
levels of commitment to a relationship or trust toward the other party increase, 
participants tend to increase the use of Compromising as a negotiation approach. 
However, this effect will be stronger for Chinese than for Americans. As discussed 
earlier, members of collectivist cultures behave rather differently, depending on 
whether the other party is a member of an ingroup or an outgroup (Leung and Bond 
1984; Gudykunst et al. 1992). For the collectivist Chinese, committing to a 
relationship is to create an ingroup. Accordingly, the goal of the ingroup will take 
priority, and Compromising as an integrated approach is more likely to be adopted to 
achieve it. Trust's positive effect on the use of Compromising also will be stronger 
for Chinese, because of their more serious reliance on human trust in exchange 
relationships (Redding 1995). On the other hand, American joint venture managers 
are found not to attach the same importance to trust as their Asian counterparts 
(Sullivan et al. 1981). Finally, we expect that the inverse relationship between felt 
Power and the use of Compromising will be stronger for Americans than for Chinese. 
Because winning, rather than mutuality, is a part of their psyche, the Americans are 
more likely to escape from a compromise situation as a power advantage is felt on 
their side. Consequently, it is posited that: 
H6a. The positive relationship between Compromising and Relationship 
Commitment is stronger for Chinese than for Americans. 
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H6b. The positive relationship between Compromising and Trust is stronger 
for Chinese than for Americans. 
H6c. The inverse relationship between Compromising and Relative Power is 
stronger for Americans than for Chinese. 
National Culture. Forcing and Relational Variables. American partners are 
known for their ~esire to maintain managerial influence in U.S.-Chinese joint ventures 
(Campbell 1986). To build a power base, most U.S. partners have attempted to 
obtain a majority equity position and therefore to take the top management position 
(Chinese Association for Enterprise Management 1991). It is not surprising that the 
Chinese set up restrictions on foreign eql,lity participation to restrain the Americans 
from using the forceful, competitive negotiation approach. On the positive side, the 
enhanced affective attachment to the relationship and accumulated confidence in the 
Chinese partner's conduct also lead to decreased use of a Forcing approach in more 
developed U.S.-Chinese joint ventures. 
On the other hand, Chinese managers' reluctance of using the Forcing 
approach in joint venture ongoing interaction is well documented. While Chinese 
officials are clear in their preference for Chinese majority or fifty-fifty ownership, 
they also encourage joint ventures as much as possible to avoid the situation where 
one side compels the other to carry out its opinion in decision making (Pearson 1991). 
Among other reasons is the Chinese culture's assigned importance to harmony and 
solidarity in interaction. Because of this cultural disposition, the Chinese managers 
are so alienated to Forcing as a negotiation approach that change in power balance as 
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well as in attitude toward the partnership and the other partner could hardly alter their 
overall low level of using this negotiation approach. 
These arguments suggest the following hypotheses: 
H7a. The inverse relationship between Forcing and Relationship Commitment 
is stronger for American than for Americans. 
H7b. The inverse relationship between Forcing and Trust is stronger for 
Americans than for Chinese. 
H7c. The positive relationship between Forcing and Relative Power is 
stronger for Americans than for Chinese. 
National Culture. LeGal Recourse and Relational Variables. A striking 
difference has been found between Americans and Chinese in their attitudes towards 
legal documents and their use {Pye 1982; Hsu 1985). In a joint venture context, 
American partners' insistence on explicit, detailed contracts has been contrasted with 
their Chinese counterparts' preference for more open, flexible legal documents 
(Martinsons and Tseng 1995). One can hardly find a connection between legalistic 
process and relationship commitment within Chinese organizations. When there is an 
· attitudinal attachment, no legal measures are taken seriously; when such an attitudinal 
attachment is missing, participants would not resort to legal process for resolution 
until they decide to dissolve the relationship. However, there is an extraordinary 
salient negative association between trust and legal actions for the Chinese. On the 
other hand, the Americans are not concerned with humanistic judgment as much as 
their Chinese counterparts in organizations. Because of their legalistic mentality, 
which is a rational choice in more complex environments, the Americans believe that 
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a legalistic approach is necessary even with trust. These observations are expressed 
in two hypotheses: 
H8a. The inverse relationship between Legal Recourse and Relationship 
Commitment is stronger for Americans than for Chinese. 
H8b. The inverse relationship.between Legal Recourse and Trust is stronger 
for Chinese than for Americans. 
Research Design and Methodology 
The aforementioned hypotheses were tested within the study. This section 
explains the research design and methodology used in collecting the data and 
developing the measurement instruments. 
Survey Methodology 
This study used a field survey to obtain information about relational contexts 
and adopted negotiation approaches within UVs settings. The unit of analysis was 
U.S.-Chinese joint ventures in the People's Republic of China (China). Key 
informants were solicited from American and Chinese joint venture managers who 
reside in China. 
To date, research on joint venture relationships has largely been descriptive 
without rigorous hypothesis testing (Habib and Burnett 1989). Most empirical 
investigations, for example, used unstructured interviews in data collection. When 
formal hypotheses can be established on strong conceptual and empirical evidence, 
methodologically more rigorous research such as a survey design with objective 
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question structure is justified. Most of the prior joint venture research collected data 
only from one side of a partnership -- often the Western side. This is a serious flaw, 
since an examination of joint venture partnership necessitates a perspective from both 
sides of the partnership (Yan and Gray 1994). Using a structured research instrument 
to collect data from both sides of the relationship, this study took one step in adopting 
more rigorous research methodologies in the study of international joint ventures. 
Research Setting 
U.S.-Chinese joint ventures wen~ .chosen as the research setting for three 
reasons. The first lies in the increasing interaction between U.S. and Chinese 
business partners. As the world;s No.1 recipient of foreign direct investment, China 
witnessed more joint ventures than any other nation in the 1980s (Beamish 1993). 
Among various forms of foreign investment, joint ventures constitute approximately 
70% of·the total amount. Following the same pattern, U.S. businesses, now the third 
largest foreign investor in China: (only after Hong Kong and Taiwan), have utilized 
joint venture as the major institutional arrangement in China (US-China Business 
Council 1991). Second, systematical investigations of U.S.-Chinese joint ventures 
have become extremely promising, since these ventures are thought to have passed the 
initial experimental phase (Shaw and Meier 1993). Third, China and the United 
States represent two rather different cultural systems (Hsu 1985), offering a sound 
testing ground for national culture's effect. 
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Pilot Studies 
During December 1994 and January 1995, a series of pilot studies were 
carried out in. China. First, the researcher attended a seminar on Chinese-foreign 
joint venture management issues in Beijing, sponsored by China Association of 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Beijing Association of Economics. The 
presentations and discussions by government officials, joint venture executives, and 
scholars and the intensive interactions between the researcher and these participants 
reviewed the current status and problems in Sino-foreign joint venture operations and 
served as a critical check on the proposed research. 
Second, the researcher personally conducted in-depth interview with 12 
individuals (7 Chinese and 5 Americans) in the Shanghai and Beijing areas. These 
.. 
individuals were joint venture managers and government officials who were 
knowledgeable about the topic. They were presented the outline of the proposed 
study and invited to comment on the appropriateness of the research questions and 
feasibility of the research design. They were then asked to respond to a preliminary 
instrument. 
Third, a pretest of the refined instrument was conducted four months later. 
The English or Chinese versions of the instrument were mailed to 6 current joint 
venture managers and 2 returned expatriates. They completed the questionnaires and 
then commented on the wording and clarity of the questions, etc. Simple comparison 
of the response patterns indicated that the measures were reliable overall. Based on 
the results, minor adjustments were made. 
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Data Collection 
The drop-off delivery-collection method was used in collecting the data. This 
decision was made based on comparing the drop-off method with two other major 
survey techniques, telephone and mail surveys. Given the length and content of the 
research instrument, telephone surveys were deemed infeasible. In comparison with 
the mail delivery, drop-off method yield a higher response rates at competitive costs 
and provide more precisely controlled sainples (Lovelock~ 1976). In light of the 
underdeveloped telephone facilities and known difficulties of conducting mail surveys 
in China, the drop-off technique appeared particularly appealing. 
The data collection process was carried out with the assistance of several 
senior Chinese researchers, all with previous experience in conducting surveys in 
China. Prior to implementing the process, the principal researcher gave a detailed 
explanation of the study and; particularly, the questionnaire to these researchers, who 
in tum trained a small group of college students in appropriate procedures. The 
questionnaires were delivered by the senior researchers and college students in teams. 
To facilitate the interaction with American respondents, each team included at least 
one member who was fluent in English. 
For the purpose of efficiency, data collection was concentrated in the Beijing 
and the Yangtze Delta around Shanghai. Inclusion of other locations would account 
for China's· vast geographic area. However, previous research has indicated that 
there are no notable differences in the joint ventures' operating experiences based on 
geographic location (National Council for US-China Trade 1987). It is safe to say 
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that the selection of the two locations will ensure a high degree of representativeness. 
Beijing is the capital of China and the location of many major foreign-Chinese joint 
ventures, whereas Shanghai is the country's most advanced industrial city and the 
Yangtze Delta has become the focal attraction to foreign investment. 
A sampling frame was compiled from databases available through the U.S.-
China Business Council, U.S.-China Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, and U.S. 
Embassy in Beijing. 309 U.S.-Chinese joint ventures were identified from these 
sources. The research assistants randomly selected 100 joint ventures and called each 
of them to ascertain the ventures' address and to ensure cooperation. Surprisingly, 
several listed joint ventures were actually wholly owned by a U.S. company. Ten 
joint ventures could not be reached through telephone. In several other cases, both 
U.S. and Chinese managers firmly refused to participate in the survey. This led to a 
· final sample of seventy-four U.S."'.'Chinese joint ventures. 
The questionnaires were delivered to the 74 joint ventures. Of the 148 
potential respondents, 143 were reached, including 74 Chinese and 69 Americans8• 
A total of 112 questionnaires were completed and subsequently collected by the 
research assistants. However, 24 questionnaires were unusable or inappropriate for 
the study. Of these, 17 questionnaires either left too many key questions unanswered . . ' . 
or were not answered appropriately. The other seven questionnaires, though 
completed, either were filled out by an American Chinese respondent, or in fact 
represented a U.S. firm with "Chinese ownership". Since a major objective of this 
8• American respondents from five joint ventures were not available at the time of delivery. 
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study is to detect cultural difference between Americans and Chinese in negotiation 
behavior, inclusion of such questionnaires would make this task difficult. The final 
sample consisted of 88 joint venture managers, including 54 Chinese and 34 
Americans. This amounted to a response rate of approximately 61 % , with 73 % for 
Chinese and 49% for Americans. Of the total 88 respondents, 27 Chinese and 27 
Americans were from the same ventures. Overall, 61 U.S.-Chinese joint ventures 
were represented in the final sample. 
Two firm characteristics, line of business and year of establishment, were 
examined to compare the 61 joint ventures with the other 13 whose representatives 
did not respond appropriately to the survey and therefore were not included in the 
study. The two groups of joint ventures were identical in their line of business, using 
a manufacturing-service categorization. For each group, the manufacturing/service 
ratio was approximately 77:23. However, there was a different between the two 
groups in terms of the year of establishment. The mean age of establishment for the 
two groups was 5.82 and 4.15 respectively, which were statistically significant (t= 
-1.86, p< .10). Although non-response bias was not considered to be a serious 
problem for the study, caution would be needed when interpreting the research 
findings. This limitation will be discussed in Chapter V. 
Measurement Instrument 
Published measures and scales that are specifically designed for joint venture 
studies have been rare. Therefore, although this study attempted to make best use of 
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existing scales, adaptations to fit the joint venture context were necessary. The final 
version of the instrument included two sets of measures to collect data on relational 
contexts and negotiation approaches. The U.S. and Chinese culture were 
operationalized by the respondent's nationality. 
Ne~otiation Approaches. Negotiation approaches, the criterion variable, was 
conceptualized as consisting of four dimensions: (1) Problem-solving; (2) 
Compromising; (3) Forcing; and (4) Legal Recourse. These dimensions would be 
measured with four sub-scales, each consisting of four items. In forming the first 
three sub-scales, I adapted 11 items from Rahim (1983) and Ganesan (1993) and 
developed one new item. The sub-scale for Legal Recourse was adapted from Boyle 
et al.. (1992). When necessary, questionnaire items were generated or modified to 
accommodate contextual idiosyncracies of the joint venture. For example, a new item 
-- "We will use our voting right to get our ideas accepted" was generated to reflect on 
the use of a unique power sources in the joint venture context. 
Relational Context. Existing scales were adopted for. measuring the three 
relational context variables -- relationship commitment, trust, and relative power. 
Relationship commitment was measured by a three-item scale adapted from Morgan 
and Hunt (1994). Two items adapted from past studies (Moorman et al. 1993; 
Ganesan 1994) and one new item formed a scale for assessing the degree of Trust. 
The measure of relative power consisted of two items adopted from Ganesan (1993, 
1994) and one new item. 
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The survey instrument also included questions pertaining to firm and 
respondent characteristics. All the measures and their sources are reported in Table 










SUMMARY OF MEASURES 
Sources 
3 items adapted from Morgan and Hunt (1994) 
2 items adapted from Moorman !UL. (1993) and Ganesan (1994) 
1 item developed for this study 
2 items adopted from Ganesan (1993, 1994) 
1 item developed for. this study 
5 items adapted from Rahim (1983) 
6 items adapted from Ganesan (1993) 
4 items adapted from Boyle !UL. (1992) 
1 item developed for this study · 
Questionnaire Language. The questionnaire was originally prepared in English 
for distribution to American managers. It was then translated into Chinese in accord 
with the standard blind translation method (Brislin, Lonner, and Thorndike 1973). A 
Chinese first translated the questionnaire into Chinese. An American then translated 
it back into English without reference to the original English version. Finally, 
revisions were made by comparing both English versions. The Chinese version of the 
questionnaire is provided in Appendix B. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
This chapter recounts the empirical findings from the study. A descriptive 
profile of respondents and the organizations they represent is first provided. Next, an 
assessment is made of the measures of key constructs. Finally, tests of hypotheses 
are conducted. 
Profile of Joint Ventures 
The sample for the study consists of 88 managerial personnel representing 61 
U.S.-Chinese joint ventures. In designing the survey instrument, attention was paid 
both to firm characteristics· and to personal traits of the respondents. 
Joint Venture Characteristics 
Years of Establishment. The duration of establishment is a good indicator of 
the relationship. The longevity of a relationship may influence the partners' 
negotiation behavior. The average number of years for this sample of joint ventures 
was 5.82, with 33 (54%) being 1-5 years, 24 (39%) being 6-10 years, and 4 (7%) 
· being 11-12 years. Thus, there is a good distribution of relationship longevity. 
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Line of Business. Joint ventures in the sample involved a wide variety of 
businesses, including manufacturing, merchandising, engineering, consulting, 
hotelling, etc. A distinction can be made between manufacturers and service 
providers. Forty-seven (77 % ) joint ventures were categorized as manufacturers and 
14 (23%) as service providers. 
Number of Employees. One general indicator of firm size is the number of 
employees. Of the 61 joint ventures, 20 (33%) had up to 100 employees, 22 (36%) 
had 101-500 employees, 10 (16%) had 501-1,000 employees, and 9 (15%) had more 
than 1,000 employees. The American reader needs to keep in mind that Chinese 
companies often hire many more employees than their American counterparts and 
foreign-Chinese joint ventures have not been particularly successful in escaping from 
the practice. 
Total Investment. Another indicator of firm size is the total investment 
committed to a venture. Thirteen (21 % ) joint ventures had a total investment of 
under$ 1 million, 34 (56%) had a total investment of $1-10 millions, and 14 (23%) 
had a total investment of larger than $10 million. 
ReS,P<>ndent Traits 
Title of Respondents. In. qualifying a potential respondent for this study, the 
key criterion was to identify boundary spanning personnel from each side who are 
linked to the partner in the joint venture. In a U.S.-Chinesejoint venture context, 
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two basic groups of positions meet this criterion. The first is the group of general 
management personnel, including general manager (or deputy/assistant general 
manager), managing director, and, in some cases, president or CEO. Following the 
Chinese tradition, a joint venture might maintain a position of "chief engineer", who 
also has general responsibility for activities in the firm. The second group consists of 
functional management personnel, that is, divisional managers in such areas as public 
relations, personnel, quality control. Sixty eight respondents (77%) identified 
themselves as general management personnel and 20 respondents (23%) identified 
themselves as functional management personnel. 
Years in Joint Venture. To provide quality answers to questions about the 
relationship between partners, a respondent has to have spent sufficient years in a 
joint venture to have observed ongoing negotiations. With two non-responses, 31 
respondents (36%) reported 1-3 years of working experience in their joint ventures, 
35 respondents ( 41 % ) reported 4-6 years, and 20 respondents (23 % ) reported 4-10 
years. The average number of years for the sample was 4.12, with the American 
group reporting 3.9 years and the Chinese group reporting 4.3 years. 
Summary 
The participating firms in the study represented a wide variety of U.S.-Chinese 
joint ventures in terms of years of establishment and employment and investment 
sizes. Examination of our conceptual framework in a cross-section context was 
assured by including joint ventures in both manufacturing and service businesses. 
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The respondents for this study were representative of management personnel from 
both American and Chinese sides. These respondents were primarily boundary 
spanning personnel who interacted with joint venture partners in the daily 
management of the joint ventures. Most of the respondents had sufficient years of 
working in the ventures to allow them to provide valid information about 
the partnerships. 
Measurement of Key Constructs 
This section presents an assessment of the measures used in this study. The 
dimensionality and reliability of the measures were examined through principal 
components factor analysis and Cronbach's alpha. 
Relational Variables 
Three constructs were included as measures of critical relational contexts: 
Relationship Commitment, Trust, and Relative Power. Each construct consisted of 
three items. As a first step in the analysis, principal components factor analysis was 
conducted to determine the dimensionality of each construct. The criterion was 
eigenvalue > 1.0 and a loading of .5 or higher on the factor. Cronbach's alpha 
statistics were then calculated for assessing scale reliabilities. The factor analysis 
results for the measure of Relationship Commitment appears in Table 8. In this case, 
9• Hereafter, the variables Relationship Commitment and Relative Power may be referred to as 
Commitment and Power for purpose of convenience. 
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a unidimensional factor structure was identified; all items loaded at levels of .5 or 
higher. The Cronbach' s · alpha was . 79. 
TABLE 8 
RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR ANALYSIS: 
MEASURE OF RELATIONAL COMMITMENT 
Factor Loadings 
1. We intend to maintain the relationship with the partner indefinitely. .90 
2. Maintenance of the relationship with the partner deserves our maximum effort. .87 
3. We are committed ·to maintaining the relationship with the partner. . 74 
Eigenvalue 1.57 
% Var 73.39 
The factor analysis results for the measure of Trust is provided in Table 9. 
The results indicated a unidimensional factor with all the items loading on a single 
factor at levels of .5 or higher. The Cronbach's alpha for the measure was .86. 
TABLE9 
RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR ANALYSIS: 
MEASURE OF TRUST 
1. We generally trust the partner. 
2. We believe that the partner will fulfil its obligations. 










The factor analysis results for the measure of Relative Power appear in Table 
10. A unidimensional factor structure was identified, with all the items loading at 
levels of .5 or higher. The Cronbach's alpha was .80 for the measure. 
TABLE 10 
RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR ANALYSIS: 
MEASURE· OF RELATIVE POWER 
Item Factor Loadings 
1. Compared to the partner, we have a stronger influence in the joint venture. .91 
2. We possessed more power than our partner in this relationship. .87 
3. We are dependent on our partner. (R) .75 
Eigenvalue. 3 .63 
% Var 71.52 
The mean scores for the relational context constructs are provided in Table 11. 
There appears to be a high level of Commitment to the joint venture relationship 
among the respondents. The level of Trust is above medium. Lastly, the respondents 
are quite neutral as to perceptions of Relative Power. And all this pattern holds for 
both Americans and Chinese. The results of three t-tests of differences between the 
American and Chinese sub-samples were statistically insignificant for Commitment 




MEAN SCORES ON MEASURES OF RELATIONAL CONTEXTS 
Measure All Subjects American Chinese 
Mean Score* Mean Score Mean Score 
(n=88) (n=34) (n=54) 
COMMITMENT 4.31 4.25 4.35 
TRUST 3.66 3.64 3.67 
POWER 3.16 2.90 3.33 
* Large values show agreement; 1 =strongly disagree, 2 =disagree, 3 =neutral, 
4=agree, 5=strongly agree. 
Negotiation Awroaches 
The measures of negotiation approaches used in this study had sound 
theoretical and empirical bases. The Problem-solving, Compromising, and Forcing 
approaches were well defined and extensive measurement efforts have been made 
based on several identical frameworks (Rahim and Magner 1995). In this study, the 
eight items for measuring Problem-Solving and Compromising approaches were 
adapted from existing scales. One Forcing question was developed to reflect on a 
unique aspect of joint ventures' power structure -- equity participation, while three 
other items were drawn from prior studies. Legal Recourse, the fourth negotiation 
approach examined in this study, was measured with four items adapted from Ganesan 
(1993) and Boyle et al. (1992). 
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A principal-component factor analysis with varimax rotation was conducted to 
examine the structure of the measures of negotiation approaches. An a priori four-
factor model with a multi-item scale was expected. The results from the analysis 
indicated a four-factor structure utilizing an eigenvalue criterion of 1.0 or higher. 
Fifteen of the 16 items loaded on four factors with one exception. One Forcing item, 
phrased as: "We will use our voting right to get our ideas accepted" loaded as .372 
on Forcing, .411 on Legal Recourse, and -.339 on Compromising. The coercive tone 
of this item seemed to overwhelm the behavioral expression of the described 
negotiation approach, so that it could intuitively relate to each of the three negotiation 
approaches. Thus, the item was removed from further analysis. The factor analysis 
was conducted for the 15 items with the loadings provided in Table 12. Factors 1-4 
reflected multi-item measures of Problem-solving, Compromising, Forcing, and Legal 
Recourse, respectively. In each instance, the items loaded on a single factor at levels 
of .5 or higher, with low loadings on all other factors. 
Reliability of the sub-scales was confirmed through examining Cronbach's. 
coefficient alpha for each. The coefficient alpha for Problem-Solving, 
Compromising, Forcing, and Legal Recourse were .82, .79, .71, and .90, 
respectively. These are well within traditionally accepted alpha levels. For purpose 
of subsequent analyses with regression techniques, the mean score for items within 
each sub-scale was calculated to represent respective negotiation approaches. The 
mean scores for the sample and for American· and Chinese sub-samples are presented 
in Table 13. 
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TABLE 12 
RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR ANALYSIS: 
MEASURES OF NEGOTIATION APPROACHES 
Item* Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings• 
Legal Problem-
Recourse Solving Compromising 
1 Remind partner of contractual obligations .8865 .1481 -.1348 
2 · Use written agreement to obtain compliance .8748 _.0847 -.0855 
3 Interpret written agreement to convince .8465 .0046 -.0771 
4 Refer to contract when disagreement occurs .8294 .13S0 -.2347 
s Get all concerns and issues into the open .0866 .8074 -.0630 
6 Show logic and benefits of own position -.0612 .7947 .1662 
7 Tell own ideas and ask partner to tell theirs .1651 .7365 .1755 
8 Enter direct discussion of problem .1235 .6954 .0388 
9 Use •give and take• to achieve compromise -.1905 .0548 .8683 
10 Try to find an intermediate position .0356 .0002 .8634 
11 Propose a middle ground -.3208 .0824 .6773 
12 Find a fair combination of gains and losses -.1291 .4193 .5560 
13 Use management authority to select propo!!al .3837 -.1511 .0535 
14 Use power to win a competitive situation -.1029 .1373 -.1586 
15 Use expertise to make decision .2644 .3996 -.2638 
Eigenvalue 
% Var 






















* The original wordings of the items can be found in the section •c. Reaching Agreement" of 
the questionnaire in Appendix. 
** Orthogonal Rotation. 
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TABLE13 
MEAN SCORES FOR MEASURES OF NEGOTIATION APPROACHES 
All Subjects American Chinese 
Measure (n=88) (n=34) (n=54) 
PROBLEM-SOLVING 4.10 4.28 3.98 
COMPROMISING 3.37 3.00 3.60 
FORCING 2.77 3.12 2.56 
LEGAL RECOURSE 2.81 3.10 2.63 
Note: Large values show likelihood; l=very unlikely, 2=unlikely, 3=neutral, 4=likely, 
S=very likely. 
Note that Problem-Solving was the most likely used approach (mean=4.10), 
followed by Compromising, Legal Recourse, and Forcing. This result at least 
partially reflects the strong effect of the joint venture's relational governance 
structure. It is a case when more integrated approaches are likely to be adopted for 
resolving disagreements, since it is difficult for partners to resolve problems simply 
by exiting the relationship (Arndt 1979). 
Insights are gained by examining the differences in mean scores for American 
versus Chinese respondents. First, the Chinese showed a great preference for both 
Problem-Solving and Compromising over Forcing and Legal Recourse. On the other 
hand, the Americans exhibited an extremely high level of preference for Problem-
solving and a median level for all other three approaches. Second, a notable 
difference was found in the responses from the two sub-samples. Among others, the 
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Americans had a higher mean score on Problem-solving, while the Chinese scored 
much higher on Compromising. As reviewed in Chapter II, this finding is 
consistent with past observations in the literature. 
Summary 
The preceding assessment through factor analysis and Cronbach' s alpha 
provides strong support for the dimensionality and reliability of the measures used in 
the study. The reliability of all measures was consistent with Nunnally's (1978) 
criterion of coefficient alpha of 0. 7. This is not surprising, as the majority of the 
items were borrowed or adapted from existing scales in marketing and management 
literature. Thus, a high level of confidence was established in using these measures 
in subsequent analyses. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
As an initial assessment of the associations among the research constructs, a 
correlation analysis was conducted. Since this analysis revealed a strong correlation 
between two predictor variables, an assessment was carried out to examine potential 
multicollinearity problems. Formal tests of the research hypotheses involved 
regression analyses. Four multiple regression models were established for examining 
the linkages between relational variables and negotiation approaches. Then a dummy 




Correlation analysis was conducted to assess the relationships among the 
predictor and criterion variables in this study. Results of the analysis were presented 
in Table 11. Among the relational variables, there was a moderately high correlation 
(. 79) between Relationship Commitment and· Trust. This find~g is consistent with 
the conceptualization that trust is a major determinant of relationship commitment 
(Achrol 1991; Morgan and Hunt 1994). 
TABLE 14 




3. RELATIVE POWER 
4. LEGAL RECOURSE 
5. COMPROMISING 
6. PROBLEM-SOL YING 
7. FORCING 
* p < .10 
** p < .05 








2. 3. 4. 5. 
-.08 
-.23** .04 
.31 *** -.20* -.33*** 
.60*** -.08 .18* .18* 




The relationships between relational variables and negotiation approaches show 
a number of strong linkages. These are examined more carefully as formal tests of 
the research hypotheses in the following sections. 
Checking for Multicollinearity 
A key assumption of regression analysis is that of independence of the 
predictor variables. Due to the relatively strong correlation between Relationship 
Commitment and Trust (r=.79, p< .01), an assessment of potential multicollinearity 
was carried out through the computation of (1) the tolerance value and (2) its 
inverse -- the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the two predictor variables. Hair et 
al. (1992, p.48) identify the commonly accepted cutoff thresholds as a tolerance level 
of .10 and VIF of 10. That is, tolerance levels below .10 and/or VIF levels above 10 
indicate collinearity. The tolerance level for both Relationship commitment and Trust 
was .38, which was well above the .10 cutoff. The variance inflation factors for 
Relationship commitment and Trust were 2.62 and 2.63 respectively, which were 
much below the 10 cutoff. These results led to the conclusion that multicollinearity is 
not a problem. 
Hypothesis Testing: Relational Context and Negotiation Awroach 
Hypotheses 1 through 4 pertain to the associations between four negotiation 
approaches and three relational variables: Relationship Commitment, Trust, and 
Relative Power. Therefore, the hypothesis tests involve simultaneously regressing the 
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relational variables on each of the four negotiation approaches. The hypotheses were 
tested through examining the statistical significance of the overall model and of the 
beta coefficients within the regression mQdels. 
Hn,othesis 1. Hypothesis 1 proposes that Problem-Solving is related to 
Relationship commitment, Trust, and Relative ~ower. Sub-hypotheses stated in 
alternate form are: 
Hla. Problem-Solving is positively. related to Relationship Commitment. 
Hlb. Problem-Solving i~ positively related to Trust. 
Hlc. Problem-Solving is inversely related to Relative Power. 
The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 15. The regression model 
is significant (p< .01) and explains 39 percent of the variance in Problem-Solving 
(adj. R2 =.39). As hypothesized, Relationship Commitment and Trust positively 
predict Problem-Solving (b=.35, p< .01; b=.20, p< .05). Relative Power does not 




REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF RELATIONAL VARIABLES 






















Hypothesis 2. · Hypothesis 2 states that Compromising approach is related to 
Relationship Commitment, Trust, Relative Power. Sub-hypotheses stated in alternate 
form are: 
H2a. Compromising is positively related to Relationship Commitment. 
H2b. Compromising is positively related to Trust. 
H2c. Compromising is inversely related to Relative Power. 
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 16. The regression model is 
significant (p< .01) and explains 17 percent of the variance in Compromising (adj. R2 
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= .17). As hypothesized, Relationship Commitment positively predicts Compromising 
(b=.48, p< .01), whereas Relative Power inversely predicts Compromising (b=-.13, 
p < .10). However, the conceptualized positive link between Trust and Compromising 
was not found (b=-.03, p> .10). Thus, the regression analysis supports H2a and 
H2c, but not H2b. 
TABLE 16 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF RELATIONAL VARIABLES 
WITH COMPRbMISING APPROACH 
Variable Beta t-value 
Constant 1.852 3.365 
Relationship Commitment .480 2.707 
Trust -.034 -.267 
Relative Power -.134 -1.891 
Adj. R2 .17 
F 6.914 
Prob. F .0003 






Compromising, it may be worthwhile to compare Compromising with Problem-
solving. While both were perceived as cooperative negotiation approaches in this 
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study, Trust affected the use of Problem-solving, but not Compromising. Recall that 
Problem-solving involves self-disclosure and open discussion, which is considered as 
a "high risk" strategy in terms of potential downside information loss (Pruitt 1981). 
In contrast, compromise can be reached simply by making concession so that it does 
not necessarily involve such risk. Since trust represents the willingness to be 
vulnerable, compared to Compromising, a Problem-Solving approach is more likely to 
prerequisite Trust. 
H)!POthesis 3. Hypothesis 3 posits a relationship between Forcing and 
Relationship Commitment, Trust, and Relative Power. Sub-hypotheses stated in 
alternate form are: 
H3a. Forcing is inversely related to Relationship Commitment. 
H3b. Forcing is inversely related to Trust. 
H3c. Forcing is positively related to Relative Power. 
The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 17. The regression model 
is significant (p< .01) and explains 28 percent of the variance in Forcing (adj. R2 = 
.28). H3a and H3b are not supported because Relationship Commitment and Trust do 
not predict Forcing (b=.09, p> .10; b=.45, p> .10). H3c posits that Relative Power 
would positively predict Forcing, and this is supported (b=.47, p<.001). 
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TABLE 17 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF RELATIONAL VARIABLES 
WITH FORCING APPROACH 
Variable Beta t-value 
Constant .731 1.218 
Relationship Commitment .089 .461 
Trust .050 .354 
Relative Power .466 6.023 
Adj. R2 .28 
F 12.36 
Prob. F .0001 






significantly related to the use of Forcing. Specifically, an increase in power will 
lead to more use of this negotiation approach. This is not surprising, since, by 
definition, Forcing is the use of power (Blake and Mouton 1964). Surprisingly, the 
hypothesized inverse relationships between Forcing and Relationship Commitment or 
Trust are disconfirmed. The data seem to suggest that the use of power, i.e., 
Forcing, is contingent only upon one's power position, but not upon one's 
psychological attachment for the relationship or the other partner in the relationship. 
Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4 argues that Legal Recourse is related to 
Relationship Commitment and Trust. Specific hypotheses stated in alternate form are: 
H4a. Legal Recourse is inversely related to Relationship Commitment. 
120 
H4b. Legal Recourse is inversely related to Trust. 
The statistical tests of the hypotheses appear in Table 18. The regression 
model is significant at the .10 level and explains 3. 8 percent of the variance in Legal 
Recourse (adj. R2 =.038). H4a is not supported because Relationship Commitment 
does not predict Legal Recourse (b=.22, p> .10). Trust inversely predicts Legal 
Recourse (b =-.41, p < .10), supporting H4b. 
TABLE 18 
· REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF RELATIONAL VARIABLES 























Since the hypothesized effect of Relationship Commitment on the use of Legal 
Recourse was not found, we have reconsidered the conceptual base underlying 
Hypothesis 4a. In an exchange relationship, parties may have to rely on legalistic 
mechanisms when affective attachment is lacking. However, since a relationship such 
as an UV is characterized with high degree of ambiguity, even committed parties may 
still use Legal Recourse as safeguard against behavioral uncertainty. 
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Hl!l>Qthesis Testing; National Culture's Moderating Effect 
Hypotheses 5 through 8 examine the national culture's moderating effect on 
the choice of negotiation approach. In order to test these hypotheses, a dummy 
variable reflecting national culture is introduced into the four original multiple 
regression models. The American sub-sample is assigned level 1 and the Chinese 
sub-sample level 0. As noted in Chapter ill, national culture is treated as a "quasi 
moderator", since it may well in_teract with the predictor variables while also being 
directly related to the-criterion variable (Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie 1981). For 
example, the cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism may interact with 
Relationship Commitment in the choice of negotiation approach. Additionally, the 
individualism-collectivism dimension . may have a direct impact on the preference for 
certain negotiation approaches by reflecting explanatory power beyond that in the 
specified variables. Hence, the four new models take the general form: 
A number of statistical results are examined within a regression model. The 
criterion variable for the model is the negotiation approach while the predictor 
variables are Relationship Commitment, Trust, Relative Power, National Culture, and 
interaction variables reflecting National Culture and each of the former antecedent 
variables. For each model, a number of findings are discussed. The first of these is 
the adjusted R2, as a measure of the variance in the criterion variable explained by the 
predictor variables. To formally examine whether national culture has increased the 
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explanatory power of the regression model, a "partial F test" is further conducted. In 
general terms, it is a test of whether additional predictor variables provide incremental 
explanatory power, given that some predictor variables are already in the model 
(Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 1985). 
Second, the statistical significance of the beta coefficients for Culture (the 
dummy variable) and for the interaction terms are discussed. If Culture is statistically 
significant, direct influence by national culture is indicated; If the interaction term is 
statistically significant, this reflects that national culture is a moderating variable. 
Finally, the signs (positive/negative) of the beta coefficient for ~h statistically 
significant variable are discussed with respect to hypothesized direction. 
Hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 5 proposes that national culture influences the 
relationships between Problem-Solving and the three relational variables. Sub-
hypotheses stated in alternate form are: 
H5a. The positive relationship between Problem-Solving and Relationship 
Commitment is stronger for Chinese than for Americans. 
H5b. The positive relationship between Problem-Solving and Trust is stronger 
for Chinese than for Americans. · 
H5c. The inverse relationship between Problem-Solving and Relative Power is 
stronger for Americans than for Chinese. 
The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 1910• The overall model 
is significant at the .0001 level with an Adj. R2 of .51. A partial F test is then 
10• For pwpose of convenience, "RC*Cul"-, "IT*Cul", and "PW*Cul" are used to denote the 
interaction terms for Relationship Commitment, Trust, and Relative Power versus National Culture. 
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conducted on the model's incremental explanatory value over the original model 
without the introduction of the culture variables. Controlling the level of significance 
at .05, an F(.95; 4, 80)=2.50 is required. Since F*=6.14>2.50, it can be concluded 
that national culture significantly increases the explanatory value of the regression 
model. 
TABLE 19 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: NATIONAL CULTURE, RELATIONAL 
VARIABLES; AND PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH 
Variable Beta t-value 
Constant 1.234 2.61 
Commitment .656 4.17 
Trust -.061 -.56 
Power .036 .60 
Culture 1.009 1.40 
Commitment*Culture -.585 -2.57 
Trust*Culture .575 3.45 
Power*Culture -.082 -.87 
Adj. R2 .51 
F 13.89 










The beta coefficient of 1.009 for Culture is statistically insignificant at the .05 
level. Thus, National Culture does not appear to have a direct influence on Problem-
Solving as a negotiation approach. The beta coefficient is -.585 for RC*Cul, which is 
significant at p < . 05. This result supports H5a and suggests that when Relationship 
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Commitment increases, Chinese would increase the use of Problem-Solving to a 
greater degree than Americans. The beta coefficient for TT*Cul is .575, which is 
statistically significant at p < . 001. However, the positive sign indicates an effect 
counter to H5b: that is, the positive relationship between Problem-Solving and Trust 
is stronger for Americans, rather than for Chinese. Finally, the beta coefficient for 
PW*Cul is -.082, which is insignificant at p > .10. Thus, H5c is not supported. 
An explanation of the contradiction of H5b may lie in the different ways 
Americans and Chinese perceive Problem-Solving as a negotiation approach. For the 
American, Problem-Solving is used in searching for facts and solutions and therefore 
is a positive approach in negotiation. Accordingly, a trusting climate should 
encourage parties to take this approach. In contrast, for the Chinese, Problem-
Solving involves confrontation, which may hurt personal feelings and relationships. 
Hence, if ambiguous communications among trusting parties carry sufficient 
background information, they are often favored over open discussions. 
Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 6 states that national culture affects the relationships 
between Compromising and the three relational variables. Sub-hypotheses stated in 
alternate form are: 
H6a. The positive relationship between Compromising and Relationship 
Commitment is stronger for Chinese than for Americans. 
H6b. The positive relationship between Compromising and Trust is stronger 
for Chinese than for Americans. 
H6c. The inverse relationship between Compromising and Relative Power is 
stronger for Americans than for Chinese. 
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Table 20 presents the results of the analysis. The overall model is significant 
at the .0001 level with an Adj. R2 of .37. For the partial F test, an F(.95; 4, 
80)=2.50 is required at the .05 level. Since F·=7.58>2.50, the test leads to the 
conclusion that the explanatory power of the regression model has been greatly 
increased by including cultural variables. The beta coefficient of -.057 for Culture is 
statistically insignificant at the .10 level, indicating no direct influence of National 
Culture on the use of Compromising approach. The beta coefficient for RC*Cul was 
.53, which is statistically significant at the .10 level. Thus, an interaction effect is 
identified. However, this effect has a direction opposite to H6a~ The beta coefficient 
for TT*Cul is -.564, which is statistically significant at the .05 level. This result 
indicates that as levels of Trust increase, Chinese increase the use of Compromising 
to a larger extent than Americans, providing support for H6b. H6c is also supported. 
The beta coefficient for PW*Cul is -.263, which is significant at the .05 level. 
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TABLE 20 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: NATIONAL CULTURE, RELATIONAL 
VARIABLES, AND COMPROMISING APPROACH 
Variable Beta t-value p-value 
Constant 2.350 3.63 .0005 
Commitment .143 .67 .5079 
Trust .242 1.61 .1123 
Power -.078 -.96 .3416 
Culture -.057 -.06 .9540 
Commitment*Culture .533 1.71 .0913 
Trust*Culture -.564 -2.47. .0155 
Power*Culture -.263 -2.04 .0446 
Adj. R2 .37 
F 8.23 
Prob. F .0001 
Hypothesis 7. Hypothesis 7 posits that national culture influences the 
relationships between Forcing and the three relational variables. Sub-hypotheses 
stated in alternate form are: 
H7a. The inverse relationship between Forcing and Relationship Commitment 
is stronger for Americans than for Chinese. 
H7b. The inverse relationship between Forcing and Trust is stronger for 
Americans than for Chinese. 
H7c. The positive relationship between Forcing and Relative Power is stronger 
for Americans than for Chinese. 
The results of the analysi_s pertaining to Hypotheses 7a-c are provided in Table 
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21. The overall model is significant at the .0001 level with an Adj. R2 of .50. For 
the partial F test, F(.95; 4, 80) =2.50 is required at the .05 level. Since 
F• = 10.48 > 2.50, it can be concluded that national culture appears to have 
significantly increased the explanatory value of the regression model. The beta 
coefficient of 3.9 for Culture is statistically significant at the .001 level, indicating 
that National Culture has a strong direct influence of Forcing as a negotiation 
approach. The beta coefficients for RC*Cul is -. 74 at the .05 level. Thus, H7a is 
supported. The test of H7b is statistically insignificant (b=.305, p> .10). The beta 
coefficient for PW*Cul is -.338, which is significant at the .05 level. However, this 
effect is the reverse of H7c and suggests a stronger positive relationship between 
Forcing and Relative Power for Chinese than for Americans. 
H7c predicts a stronger association between Forcing and Relative Power for 
Americans. However, this hypothesis is not supported. As a post hoc explanation, 
one can consider "power distance", .the culture dimension that examines the extent to 
which power inequality is accepted and expected (Hofstede 1980). According to 
Hofstede's research findings, the Chinese culture places greater importance on power 
relationships than the American culture. Because of this, Chinese may be more 




REGRESSION ANALYSIS: NATIONAL CULTURE, RELATIONAL 
VARIABLES, AND FORCING APPROACH 
Variable Beta t-value ~ p-value 
Constant -1.320 -1.96 .0529 
Commitment .494 2.21 .0300 
Trust -.128 -.81 .4177 
Power .660 7.77 .0001 
Culture 3.903 3.82 .0003 
Commitment*Culture -.741 -2.29 .0248 
Trust*Culture .305 1.29 .2013 
Power*Culture -.338 -2.52 .0136 
Adj. R2 .50 
F 13.66 
Prob. F ·.0001 
Hypothesis 8. Hypothesis 8 argues that national culture modifies the 
associations between Legal Recourse and two relational variables -- Relationship 
Commitment and Trust. Sub-hypothesis stated in alternate form are: 
H8a. The inverse relationship between Legal Recourse and Relationship 
Commitment is stronger for Americans than for Chinese. 
H8b. The inverse relationship between Legal Recourse and Trust is stronger 
for Chinese than for Americans. 
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The regression model for testing HS is provided in Table 22. The overall 
model is significant at the .01 level with an Adj. R2 of .13. For the partial F test, an 
F(.95; 3, 82)=2.72 is required at the .05 level. Since F*=3.96>2.72, the test 
indicates that national culture has greatly increased the explanatory value of the 
model. The beta coefficient of 4. 70 for Culture is statistically significant at the .01 
level, indicating a direct impact of National Culture on the choice of Forcing as a 
negotiation approach. The beta coefficient for RC*Cul is -1.12, which is significant 
at p < .05. Tlius, H8a is supported. The beta coefficients for TT*Cul is .16, which 
is statistically insignificant at p > .10, not supporting H8b. 
TABLE 22 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: NATIONAL CULTURE, RELATIONAL 
VARIABLES, AND LEGAL RECOURSE 
Variable Beta t-value 
Constant 1.139 1.10 
Commitment .806 2.14 
Trust -.549 -2.09 
Culture 4.704 3.08 
Commitment*Culture -1.116 -2.05 
Trust*Culture .155 .39 
R2 .13 
F 3.58 










Table 23 provides a summary of the tests of the research hypotheses. 
Out of the eleven main effect hypotheses, six are supported. Relational contexts, as 
reflected on Relationship Commitment, Trust, and Relative Power, condition the 
negotiation behavior in substantial ways. 
For each of the four regression models, the introduction of culture terms 
increases the adjusted R2• More importantly, the partial F tests demonstrate that 
national culture significantly increases the explanatory power of the models. In the 
cases of Forcing and Legal Recourse, the regression analysis also reveals a direct 
influence of national culture. Out of the eleven hypotheses regarding national 
culture's moderating effect, the regression analysis provides support for five 
hypotheses. As to another three hypotheses, while statistically significant effects are 
found, the direction of the effects are in contradiction with originally hypothesized. 
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TABLE 23 
SUMMARY OF THE TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis 
Relational Variables: Main Effects 
Hla Problem-solving is positively related to relationship commitment 
Hlb Problem-solving is positively related to trust 
Hlc Problem-solving is inversely related to relative power 
H2a Compromising is positively related to relationship commitment 
H2b Compromising is positively related to trust 
H2c Compromising is inversely related to relative power 
H3a Forcing is inversely related to relationship commitment 
H3b Forcing is inversely related to trust 
H3c Forcing is positively related to relative power 
H4a Legalistic approach is inversely related to relationship commitment 
H4b Legalistic approach is inversely related to trust 
National Culture: Moderating Effects 
HSa The positive relationship between PS and RC is stronger for Chinese 
H5b The positive relationship between PS and IT is stronger for Chinese 
H5c The inverse relationship between PS and PW is stronger for Americans 
H6a The positive relationship between CM and RC is stronger for Chinese 
H6b The positive relationship between CM and IT is stronger for Chinese 
H6c The inverse relationship between CM and PW is stronger for Americans 
H7a The inverse relationship between FO and RC is stronger for Americans 
H7b The inverse relationship between FO and IT is stronger for Americans 
H7c The positive relationship between FO and PW is stronger for Americans 
H8a The inverse relationship between LE and RC is stronger for Americans 
























Note: "PS", "CM", "FO", and "LE" are used to denote Problem-Solving, Compromising, 
Forcing, and Legal Recourse; 
"no effect" means the beta is statistically insignificant at p > .10; 
"opposite" indicates a significant effect counter to predicted; 
* P<.10 




DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The previous chapter presented the results of the research project, focusing on 
the various statistical analyses performed and the outcome of these efforts. In this 
chapter, attention turns to implications of the research findings and to 
recommendations for further research. To begin, the fundamental research questions 
and basic research design are reviewed. Then, the results of the study are interpreted 
and their implications discussed. Finally, the research project is evaluated in terms of 
its limitations and recommendations for future studies. 
Theoretical Background 
To search for the causes of a high failure rate among strategic alliances, recent 
research has shifted attention from the formal structures to the process aspects of such 
inter-organizational arrangements (Dabholkar, Johnston, and Cathy 1994; Tallman and 
Shenkar 1994; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Gundlach 1994). According to these 
studies, an alliance's success or failure relies on the selection of an appropriate 
partner, the formal structure, and the initial negotiations leading to the formation of 
the alliance. However, it also relies on the interaction between partners in their daily 
management of the alliance. Particularly, partners' mishandling of ongoing 
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negotiation and misunderstandings of each other's negotiation approach lead to 
deterioration and premature termination of the relationships. Given strategic 
alliances' increasing popularity, it becomes a timely research topic to investigate the 
contextual variables that influence partners' use of different negotiation approaches 
(Ganesan 1993; Dabholka, Johnston, and Cathy 1994). Recent research has also 
called for attention to the potential influence of national culture on partners' choices 
of negotiation approaches, as cross-cultural strategic alliances have been a more 
prominent phenomenon in the intematiorntl marketplace. 
To examine the ongoing interactions in cross-cultural strategic alliances, this 
study addressed two related research questions: (1) How do relational variables 
influence partners' use of varying negotiation approaches? and (2) How does national 
culture moderate the linkages between relational variables and the choice of 
negotiation approaches? 
Negotiation and Negotiation Approaches 
The concept of negotiation used in this study stems from a macro-process 
perspective that considers negotiation as a process involving a broad range of social 
contexts and longitudinal process (Stem, Bagozzi, and Dholakia 1977; Guetzkow 
1977; Rubin and Brown 1975). In this perspective, negotiation is an interaction mode 
that bears on the establishment and development of human relationships involving 
complex social units (Gulliver 1988; Rosen 1984). As one of many mechanisms for 
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resolving social conflicts, negotiation is characterized by an explicit intent to reach an 
agreement among conflicting participants (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). 
Participants may take different approaches in the negotiation process. In the 
negotiation literature, several negotiation approaches such as problem-solving and 
compromising have been consistently included in existing typologies (e.g., Blake and 
Mouton 1964; Thomas 1976; Rahim 1983). This study examined four negotiation 
approaches ~- problem-solving, compromising, forcing, and legal recourse. A review 
of the joint venture literature, supplemented with the findings from the field 
interviews with managers in Sino-foreign joint ventures, indicated that joint venture 
partners used these approaches in ongoing negotiations for resolving disagreements. 
Problem-solving is observed when parties openly exchange information about 
priorities and utilities associated with the issues to be settled and actively search for 
alternative courses of action. This negotiation approach represents a desire to 
integrate the concerns of both parties (Thomas 1976). Because of its argumentive, yet 
integrative features, the problem-solving approach is sometimes referred to as 
integrative bargaining (Perdue and Summers 1991). 
Compromising refers to the negotiation approach that seeks a middle ground 
between the initial positions of both parties (Froman and Cohen 1970). By 
exchanging concessions, the parties attempt to reach some expedient, mutually 
acceptable agreement. However, in contrast to problem-solving, a compromising 
approach may result in a solution which is short of total satisfaction for either party. 
Forcing involves using power to make the other party comply (Blake and 
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Mouton 1964). This approach often represents a desire to win one's own concerns at 
the other party's expense when the negotiation is viewed as a process for the division 
of some fixed set of resources (Pruitt 1981). 
Legal Recourse is the strategy when a party appeals to a formal legal 
agreement to gain compliance (Frazier and Summers 1984). While legal documents 
provide a "fair" basis through which parties can engage in ongoing negotiations, a 
legalistic approach may harbor ill will and therefore lessen the cooperative nature of 
the long-term relationships. 
Relational Contexts of Negotiation 
Negotiation behavior is conditioned by various social contexts. An 
understudied but most fundamental aspect of such social contexts is the relational 
context (Greenhalgh and Chapman 1995), that is, the elements defining the character 
of the exchange relationship (Dant and Schul 1992). Drawing on prior studies from 
multiple research traditions, the study investigated three relational variables --
relationship commitment, trust, and relative power. 
The centrality of the power construct (or its opposite -- dependence) in the 
study of negotiation behavior has been widely recognized by marketing as well as 
other behavioral scientists. Defined as a potential for influence on another's beliefs 
and behavior, power results from a party's control of resources that the other party 
wants or needs (Blau 1964; El-Ansary and Stem 1972). Power relations can influence 
participants' negotiation stance. In an unbalanced power relation, for example, the 
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powerful party is more likely to engage in competitive or coercive behavior, while the 
less powerful party is less likely to adopt such approaches (Dwyer and Walker 1981; 
Dwyer and Oh 1987; Dabholkar, Johnston, and Cathy 1994; Frazier and Summers 
1986). 
Trust refers to the belief about the promise and reliability of another party 
(Blau 1964; Rotter 1967; Schurr and Ozanne 1985). Trust is considered as being 
supportive of certain negotiation approaches. For instance, trusting relationships are 
more likely to be associated with the use of a problem-solving approach (Pruitt 1981), 
but temper the tendency to adopt a legalistic approach (Ring and Van de Ven 1994). 
A related, cooperation-centered construct is that of relationship commitment --
" an enduring desire to maintain a valued relationship" (Moorman, Zaltman, and 
Deshpande 1992, p.316). Relationship commitment is regarded by recent research as 
central to relationship marketing, because it represents an affective attachment to an 
organization for its own sake and therefore commands the kind of behaviors that 
maintain the relationship (Morgan and Hunt 1994). While systematic research is still 
lacking, recent frameworks of relational exchange have conceptualized, in general 
terms, the effect of relationship commitment on negotiation behavior in long-term 
business relationships. As proposed by Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer (1995), 
parties in committed relationships should use negotiation strategies that are compati.ble 
with relational social norms. In a joint venture contexts, for example, information 
exchange and problem-solving are preferred approaches by a committed partner (Lane 
and Beamish 1990). 
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National Culture and Negotiation Behavior 
National culture is defined as shared values that assert influence on human 
behavior (Kluckhohn 1951; Kluckhohn and Strodbeck 1961; Hofstede 1980; Child 
1981). There is considerable evidence for national culture's influence on individual, 
organizational, and particularly negotiation behavior. For example, the effect of the 
cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism on negotiation behavior has been 
extensively studied (e.g., Leung 1988; Trubisky, Ting-Toomey, and Lin 1991). To a 
much less extent, prior research in anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and 
management also reveals several additional cultural dimensions that have a bearing on 
negotiation behavior. These culture dimensions include (1) Tolerance of ambiguity; 
(2) Humanism; and (3) Long-term orientation. Inclusion of these dimensions would 
lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the cultural context of negotiation. 
A proper conceptualization of the effect of national culture requires the 
specification of magnitude and form of such effect. However, no major effort has 
been made to address this issue. Assuming relational contexts are of greater 
importance than cultural ones, this study takes national culture as a moderating 
variable. Specifically, national culture is posited to modify the form of relationship 
between relational contexts and negotiation approaches through interaction with the 
relational variables. Since the culture dimensions are somehow directly related to the 
negotiation approaches, national culture may be further defined as a quasi moderator 
(Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie 1981). 
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Research Methodology 
A field survey design was used to investigate the research questions. Prior to 
the main study, pilot studies and pre-tests were conducted to refine research questions 
and to examine the appropriateness of the survey instrument. In developing the 
questionnaire, this study adhered to two principles. First, it took full advantage of 
existing scales. In the end, the majority of the items were borrowed or adapted from 
existing measures. This proved to be a wise strategy, as evidenced by the overall 
satisfactory reliability and dimensionality of the measures. Second, it used multiple 
items for measuring each construct. Difficulties were found in implementing this 
strategy with a sample consisting of front-line managers. Although no construct was 
measured with more than four items, several joint venture managers made comments 
on the questionnaire's "redundance". 
The delivery-collection method was used in collecting data for the study. 
Compared with other survey techniques, this method allowed for a higher response 
rate given the content of the instrument and time constraint of the study. The 
questionnaires were distributed and picked up by trained research assistants at each 
joint venture. 
Research Findings 
The findings from this study make substantial contributions to the field of 
marketing management, especially the emerging relationship marketing literature. 
The associations between participants' negotiation approaches and critical relational 
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contexts were conceptualized. Toward a systematic understanding of the influence of 
national culture on negotiation behavior, various culture dimensions of relevance were 
identified and national culture's effect was explored in its capacity of moderating the 
linkages between negotiation approach and relational contexts. These 
conceptualizations were empirically investigated and partially supported in a U.S.-
Chinese joint venture context. 
Relational Commitment and Trust 
In advocating the new, relationship marketing paradigm, Morgan and Hunt 
(1994) identify relationship commitment and trust as key mediating variables that are 
critical to success of relationship marketing. Results from this study indicate that 
these two variables impact partners' choice of negotiation approaches, which 
presumably have a bearing on the success or failure of strategic alliances. 
Specifically, commitment to a relationship is found to foster the use of problem-
solving and compromising approaches to ongoing negotiation. Similarly, the highly 
conceptualized relationship between trust and the use of a problem-solving approach is 
also confirmed. Thus, an integrative negotiation stance, as reflected in openly 
discussing concerns and actively searching alternatives, is largely related to the extent 
to which a partner is affectively attached to the relationship or holds a belief in the 
other party's trustiness. Compromise, while it may not always bring about the best 
solution to a problem, often is a necessity for sustaining a relationship. Apparently, 
this negotiation approach is, more likely to be adopted by parties who value a 
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relationship and determine to make maximum effort in its maintenance. Hence in 
order to promote a healthy, constructive interaction climate within a strategic alliance, 
the management's task becomes to find ways by which commitment can be enhanced 
and trust can be nourished. 
Drawing on insights from prior studies on international joint ventures, this 
study hypothesizes an inverse relationship between participants' levels of trust and 
their use of legalistic approach in daily interaction. The.current study found strong 
support for this hypothesis. In recent discussions on the legalization of organizations, 
some authors considered trust as a viable alternative to contracts (Smitka 1994). For 
other authors, legalistic measures serve as remedies to lacking of trust: when trust is 
disrupted or distrust is engendered, organizations rely upon legalistic mechanisms to 
reproduce trust (Zucker 1986; Shapiro 1987). While the extent to which trust may be 
a viable alternative tool for governing exchange relationships remains unclear, the 
conceptualized inverse relationship between legalistic approach and trust seems well 
established. 
Relative Power 
In the marketing channel literature, the power construct has long been 
considered influential on negotiation and influence behavior. Results form this study 
suggests that power relations remain an important factor associated with choice of 
different negotiation approaches in a typical strategic alliance. 
Particularly, a partner's relative power is positively associated with the use of 
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forcing, but negatively associated with use of compromising. While these results are 
expected, they are most informative with respect to the research setting. Thus, even 
in strategic alliances where partners dedicate transaction-specific investments and have 
high expectation for relationship continuity, coercive negotiation approaches are still 
likely in asymmetrical power relations. While long-term exchange relationships 
necessitate the adoption of noncoercive negotiation behavior, powerful partners might 
act as if they run a wholly-owned subsidiary. It is not surprising that this dominant 
mentality often drives joint venture partners to fight for a majority equity position in 
initial negotiations. 
National Culture-Negotiation Link 
In presenting her authoritative account of Chinese negotiation styles, Pye 
(1982) contends that "unquestionably the largest and possibly the most intractable 
category of problems in Sino-American business negotiations can be traced to the 
cultural differences between the two countries" (p.20). The findings in this study 
suggest that national culture can be an important indicator of negotiation behavior 
among partners in international strategic alliances. Although not hypothesized, the 
study confirms prior observations that national culture has a direct impact on the 
choice of negotiation approaches. In the cases of Forcing and Legal Recourse, the 
use of these two negotiation approaches is much more likely among Americans than 
among Chinese. 
The study focuses on how national culture interacts with relational contextual 
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variables in conditioning participants' choice of various negotiation approaches. For 
example, the study results indicate that the positive effect of trust on the use of 
problem-solving and compromising may be different depending on whether the 
respondent is American or Chinese. With respect to problem-solving, the effect is 
stronger for Americans, whereas in the case of compromising, the effect is stronger 
for Chinese. These results were unexpected yet informative. One explanation lies in 
the different perceptions held by the American and Chinese respondents regarding the 
nature of the two negotiation approaches. Recall that in Thomas' (1976) two-
dimension model, problem-solving is considered as being more cooperative than 
compromising, given that the former tends to bring about more integrative solutions 
that best serve both parties' interests. However, the Chinese may favor 
compromising over problem-solving, since problem-solving involves confrontations 
which are thought to endanger a relationship. Thus, with increased levels of trust, the 
Americans may express a stronger tendency toward problem-solving, whereas the 
Chinese may increase the use of compromising to a larger degree. 
The findings regarding national culture's effect on the association between 
problem-solving and relative power is most surprising. Recall that the study results 
did not support our prediction of an inverse association between relative power and 
problem-solving. We expected an explanation with the introduction of cultural terms 
into the regression model. Again, neither direct nor indirect effects of national 
culture were found. Eventually, we tum attention to the research setting, the Sino-
U.S. joint ventures. Because of the Chinese government's stipulation on Chinese 
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majority or fifty-fifty ownership in these joint ventures, Chinese majority or equal 
ownership has been far more common than foreign majority ownership. However, 
the Chinese have also been clear in their opposition to the dominating, coercive 
approach in joint venture decision-making. On the other hand, although the American 
partners may not be particularly successful in achieving a powerful position in these 
joint ventures, their competitive stance in ongoing negotiation could be 
disproportionally strong in light of their power position. The descriptive statistics of 
this study seem to support this speculation. Overall, the American respondents' felt 
power was not as strong as that of the Chinese respondents, yet their likelihood of 
using the forcing approach was greater. 
Research and Managerial Implications 
This research sought to better understand the interaction process in strategic 
alliances. With partners' negotiation approaches as the primary concern, the research 
focused on several relational variables that constitute a critical context of the 
negotiation process and on national culture that is posited to influence negotiation 
behavior. The results of the study have implications for both marketing research and 
practice. 
Research Implications 
The study takes a negotiation perspective in exploring the interaction process 
within strategic alliances. This behavioral approach is a response to the inability of 
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the structure-centered economic approach to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
inter-organizational process. While marketing researchers have not paid much 
attention to joint ventures as a complex marketing institution, existing 
conceptualizations and methodological convictions in marketing, as evidenced in this 
study, can be very effective in capturing the behavioral sophistication of the joint 
venture process. 
A major contribution of this study is its extension of empirical understanding 
of the negotiation process. The ultimate goal of the study is not to examine joint 
ventures per se, but the ongoing interaction within long-term exchange relationships. 
Joint ventures were chosen as the research setting because, due to their tighter 
bonding structure, joint ventures provide a situation where frequent interaction and 
negotiation typify the partnership. Particularly as governance structure may affect the 
need and nature of the negotiation approach (Boyle et al. 1992; Mohr and Nevin 
1990), the study of joint ventures, along with research on conventional channel 
relationships, allows for comparing ongoing negotiation processes in equity-based and 
in nonequity-based strategic alliances. In this study, the results lend support to 
several contentions derived from conventional, arm's-length channel relationships. 
For example, the study reveals a significant positive association between relative 
power and the use of a forcing approach, which is consistent with earlier findings in 
the marketing literature (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Kale 1986; Frazier, Gill, and Kale 
1989). However, other findings raise doubts about the universal applicability of 
existing conceptualizations. For instance, counter to recent observations on a positive 
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link between relative power and the problem-solving approach (Frazier and Rody 
1991; Ganesan 1993; Boyle and Dwyer 1995), relative power in this study is not 
significantly related to the use of this negotiation approach. This latter finding may 
imply that power use in the quasi-integration type of inter-organizational governance 
structure is different from negotiation within conventional associations. In 
conventional contractual relationships, the powerful party may opt for the problem-
solving strategy because of concern about future retaliation and a shift in power 
balance (Ganesan 1993). However, in joint venture relationships, power structure is 
relatively stable and structural bonds thwart withdrawal. The dominant party is more 
likely to take advantage of the power imbalance, but less likely to engage in 
integrative problem-solving. 
Recent shifts in marketing research from discrete transaction to relational 
exchange call attention to cooperation-centered constructs (Morgan and Hunt 1994). 
This research extends existent understanding of such concepts as relationship 
commitment and trust to the context of joint venture ongoing negotiations. Strong 
support is provided for the contention that these relational variables have an important 
bearing on alliance partners' use of negotiation strategies. At the same time, the 
study warns against the tendency to overlook the critical role of the competition-
centered construct, power, since self-interests remain a facet of life in even the most 
cooperative alliances. For example, the study reveals that, while relationship 
commitment and trust lead to more frequent use of problem-solving, relative power 
has a significant positive influence on the use of forcing in joint venture interactions. 
146 
Thus, the study supports a holistic perspective in inter-organizational research that 
considers both cooperation- and competition-centered constructs. 
Another contribution of this study is its introduction of national culture as a 
contextual variable and thus, further testing of the applicability of conventional 
conceptualizations originated in the U.S. As evidenced in this study, established 
theories or models may be enriched by an appreciation of national cultural 
differences. For example, results of this study suggest that the conceptualized 
association between relationship commitment and problem-solving takes different 
forms depending on whether the subject is an American or a Chinese. As previously 
discussed! this finding is indicative of the deep impact of the culture dimension of 
collectivism on negotiation behavior through its interaction with relationship 
commitment. Looking at the interaction effects demonstrated in this and other cases, 
one would suspect that many of the existing theories are a function of national 
culture. While the conclusions and inferences regarding culture's interaction with 
relational variables in this study should be treated as tentative, they point to a new 
path for sharpening our understanding of relationship processes across diverse social 
contexts. 
Explicitly conceptualizing national culture as a moderating variable 
distinguishes this study from most prior studies that include culture as a theoretical 
variable. Although national culture has been viewed as important for understanding 
the negotiation process, the mechanisms through which culture influences negotiation 
behavior have rarely been specified. The study suggests that national culture has a 
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critical impact on negotiation behavior, both directly and indirectly. Since the 
negotiation process occurs in a context that consists of multiple, intertwined facets, 
isolated investigation into culture's effect can only lead to incomplete or biased views 
of the effects of national culture and of the negotiation context as a whole. 
Managerial Implications 
The study calls for management attention to the negotiation approaches taken 
by alliance partners in daily interaction, since failure to manage ongoing negotiation 
effectively is a major cause for alliances' instability and premature dissolution. Up-
front attention to alliance structure is important, but not sufficient. If management 
can find a way to handle ongoing negotiation more effectively for resolving emergent 
disagreements between partners, the chance to arrest the alliances' high failure rate 
will be greatly increased. Given their low instability rate, Sino-U.S. joint ventures 
represent a relatively successful case of international joint ventures. According to the 
study results, there is a high incidence of problem-solving as the chosen approach in 
these ventures. Comparatively, dominating and legalistic approaches are less 
preferred in ongoing negotiation. This corroborates the critical assumption underlying 
this study, that successful interorganizational relationships often associate with a more 
integrative negotiation approach among cooperating parties. 
With respect to the contextual variables purported to drive the choice of 
different negotiation approaches, this study stresses a set of critical relational factors 
that constitute a fundamental condition of the negotiation process. Specifically, 
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affective commitment and trust foster the use of more integrated approaches, whereas 
relative power induces coercive, competitive behavior. Thus, for a company wishing 
to maintain a valued relationship and to nurture trust with its partner, adoption of 
problem-solving and compromising often can be expected. In the same token, a 
partner may assess the other partner's attitude toward the partnership by observing the 
latter's approach to negotiation, since the negotiation approach will signify 
commitment and trust. Building power bases through equity participation has long 
been a central concern among American partners in Sino-U.S. joint ventures. Yet 
from a negotiation perspective, a balance of power may be an optimum choice if the 
purpose is to foster an integrated interaction climate. 
Indeed, a Chinese majority equity position in Sino-U.S. joint ventures is rarely 
translated into a dominating, forceful negotiation approach on the Chinese side. This 
fact may underscore the importance of national culture as a consideration in cross-
cultural relationship management. First, for the management, an assessment of the 
cultural characteristics of international partners may lead to different approaches to 
alliance structuring. In our case, if the Chinese' national attitude toward coercive, 
competitive negotiation approach can be predicted, why should the U.S. partners 
always seek a costly equity position simply for safeguarding against being dominated 
in unforeseen conflict resolution? 
Second and more important, alliance partners can use knowledge of national 
culture to develop effective negotiation strategies. Particularly, more than a rough 
idea about cultural difference between international partners is key to establishing 
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appropriate expectations about the partner's approach to negotiation. Only with such 
realistic expectations could one deal with the situations in which the foreign partner 
appears to be following different rules of the game. 
In more developed stages, international partners may need to learn and adapt 
to each other's negotiation approach, since the possible negative effect of cultural 
difference on alliance longevity and effectiveness can be dynamically moderated by an 
adaptation process (Parkhe 1991). A vivid example is found in a leading U.S.-
Chinese joint venture11 • After collaborafi,ng for ten years, both partners have 
developed an understanding of each other's culturally different assumptions and norms 
and moved toward overcoming such differences that they believe hinder effective joint 
undertaking. Not only has the Chinese partner become used to frank and open 
information exchange, but the American partner has also developed an appreciation of 
the compromising approach. The widely publicized success of the joint venture seems 
to suggest that relationship marketing demands the establishment of mutually accepted 
corporate norms. 
To facilitate such a learning-adaptation process, multinational companies may 
use cross-cultural training and other sophisticated programs for promoting inter-
cultural awareness. Key to successful implementation of these programs is the top 
management's adoption of a culturally sensitive approach toward alliance managing. 
If the ethnocentric mentality against "ugly foreigners" remains dominating, the 
benefits of such costly but beneficial· efforts cannot be fully appreciated. 
11 • The story was told by both American and Chinese managers, who were interviewed by the current 
researcher. To assure confidentiality, the name of the joint venture is not reported here. 
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Limitations of the Research 
As with any research, there are limitations to this study that temper the 
findings. In examining the results of the study, a major consideration was with the 
methodology used in data collection. First, while an overall 61% response rate was 
within the acceptable range for a study of this nature, the sample size was relatively 
small. In particular, fewer American managers participated in the survey than did 
Chinese. A major reason for joint venture managers' reluctance in participating was 
their concern about confidentiality with regard to questions pertaining to ongoing 
relationships, although the confidentiality was firmly assured when the questionnaires 
were delivered to them. Additionally, the survey instruments were considered as too 
lengthy by several joint venture managers. 
Second, the study employed a cross-sectional design, which made it difficult to 
establish causality. The conclusions of the study are made based on information 
collected from among a sample of joint venture managers at one point of time. 
However, the study results are interpreted in such a way that a high degree of trust 
leads to more use of the problem-solving strategy. Yet a reverse sequence is also 
conceivable; namely, frequent use of the problem-solving strategy results in trust. In 
research on relationships such as this, longitudinal studies would provide for stronger 
inferences. 
Third, concerning possible measurement error, it is ideal to take the multiple 
informant approach in such a survey. In a joint venture context, soliciting informants 
at both joint venture management and parent company levels is particularly appealing. 
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Given the various resource constraints, however, this research took the single 
informant approach. 
A main objective of the study was to explore more fully the relational contexts 
of negotiation. To this end, relationship commitment, trust, and relative power were 
examined simultaneously. However, there are other aspects of the relationship that 
may be important, but were not included in this study. For example, exchange 
interaction is affected not only by relative asymmetry of power, but also by the 
magnitude of interdependence, defined as the sum of the dependence in an exchange 
(Gundlach and Cadotte 1994). Another variable that is missing from this study is 
environmental uncertainty. Apparently the operating environments of the joint 
ventures have different implications to American and Chinese managers. For the 
Americans, it is a foreign, unfamiliar situation. The higher degree of perceived 
uncertainty among the American partners may influence their behavior in the 
operation of the joint ventures. Their emphasis on legal recourse, for example, may 
be partially a result of such perception. 
This dissertation examined two critical relational variables -- trust and relative 
power in their effects on participants' negotiation approach. However, as a recent 
study revealed, these two variables may interact in influencing the, behavioral 
intentions of channel members (Andaleeb 1995). Consistent with prior research, this 
study also revealed a strong correlation between relationship commitment and trust. 
Restricted by the objective and selected statistical techniques of this study, the 
potential interaction effects among these relational variables were not explored. 
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Directions for Future Research 
This examination of the relational contexts of negotiation approach in the 
context of cross-cultural strategic alliances has been encouraging. However, future 
research is needed, especially in light of the limitations discussed in the previous 
section. First, more sophisticated theory-building is needed in which additional 
relational variables and other correlates are integrated. As implied in the results of 
hypothesis testing, current conceptualizations have not fully captured the mechanism 
of relationship processes. A comprehensive conceptual model should also expand to 
examine interaction effects of various relational variables on partners' negotiation 
approach. Furthermore, other sets of contextual variables and objective correlates 
may be incorporated into these models to draw a more comprehensive picture of 
negotiation behavior in strategic alliances. Apparently, to accomplish the task 
mentioned above, future research should use more powerful modeling approaches and 
statistical techniques, such as structural equation modeling. 
Second, addressing the methodological limitations of this study, several 
avenues may be taken to secure better data sources in future research. Given inherent 
limitations to the survey design, future research may employ a triangulation 
methodology. Among the alternative data collection techniques, qualitative personal 
interviews and multiple-case method offer certain advantages in the context of 
international business and international joint venture in particular (Yeung 1995; 
Parkhe 1991). Use of these data collection methods in conjunction with a 
questionnaire survey would greatly strengthen the quality of data. 
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Third, replication is conceivably a useful and important path for extending the 
current research. This research found the moderating effects of national culture on 
the linkage between relational contexts and negotiation approach in a U.S.-Chinese 
joint venture context. However, the results are mixed, indicating limitations of the 
current understanding of national culture as a contextual condition of negotiation. 
While this study can be replicated to different cross-cultural interfaces, an immediate 
extension may be made among joint ventures between Chinese and their Asian 
counterparts, including Japanese, Korean, and "overseas Chinese" from Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. Since partners in these joint ventures hold identical or similar cultural 
backgrounds, investigations of these ventures and comparison of their results with 
those from the current study would further verify the effect of national culture. 
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The following questions regard the organiz.ations that form the joint venture. Thus the word "we" in the statements means 
your company and "partner" means the Chinese company in the joint venture. There are no right or wrong answers. All 
information will be held in strictest confidence. Thank you for your participation! 
A. Existing Relationships in the Joint Venture 
The following questions relate to the relationships currently existing between your company and your partner 
company in the joint venture. Please rate the extent to which you agree with each statement. 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
1. We are committed to maintaining 
the relationship with the partner 1 2 3 4 5 
2. We possess more power than our partner 
in this relationship 1 2 3 4 5 
3. We generally trust the partner 1 2 3 4 5 
4. We make efforts to understand the ways 
our Chinese counterparts do things 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Compared to the partner, we have a stronger 
influence in the joint venture 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Our interactions with the partner 
are productive 1 2 3 4 5 
7. We make necessary adjustments to 
the partner's management style 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Maintenance of the relationship with 
the partner deserves our maximum effort 1 2 --- 3 4 5 
9. We are dependent on our partner 1 2 3 4 5 
10. We frequently interact with the partner 
in managing the joint venture 1 2 3 4 5 
11. We believe that the partner will fulfil 
its obligations 1 2 3 4 5 
12. We intend to maintain the relationship 
with the partner indefinitely 1 2 3 4 5 
13. We learn from the partner's management methods 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Promises made by the partner are reliable 2 3 4 5 
15. Overall, our interactions with the 
partner are adequate 1 2 3 4 5 
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Strongly Strongly 
Di~agree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
16. We are satisfied with the our personal 
relationship with the Chinese partner 1 2 3 4 5 
17. The joint venture's financial 
performance is satisfactory 1 2 3 4 5 
18. We are satisfied with our overall 
relationship with the partner 1 2 3 4 5 
B. Issues of Disagreement 
In any joint ventures, there will be disagreement from time to time. Please rate (1) the frequency of 
disagreement; and (2) the level of disagreement between you and your partner on each of the following issues. 
Fr~yen~}'. Level 
of disagreement of disagreement 
Never Constantly Very Low Vea High 
1. Additional capital inputs from 
either parent companies to support 
financial needs of the joint venture 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Accessibility to update technology 
from a parent company 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
3. A partner's attempt to make changes 
in the terms of the joint venture contract 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Communications between partners 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
5. A partner's attempt to control major 
decisions in the venture 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Which partner exercises daily 
management control 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
7. The amount of profit to be retained 
in the joint venture 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Hiring policies in the joint venture 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Interpretations of the contract terms 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Placement of parent company personnel in 
management positions in the joint venture 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Personal relationships between partners 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Management/decision-making styles 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
13. New product development 1 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 
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C. Reaching Agreement 
Suppose there is a disagreement between your company and your partner company over an important issue, such 
as those you just considered above. Please indicate the likelihood that your company will take each of the 
following actions to reach an agreement with the partner. 
Very Very 
Unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely Likely 
1. We will enter into a direct discussion 
of the problem with our partner 1 2 3 4 5 
2. We will remind the partner of its 
obligations stipulated in contracts 1 2 3 4 5 
3. We will use our management authority 
to select our proposal 1 2 3 4 5 
4. We will propose a middle ground 1 2 3 4 5 
5. We will attempt to get all our concerns 
and issues into the open 1 2 3 4 5 
6. We will use our voting right to get our ideas accepted 1 2 3 4 5 
7. We will refer to the written contract when there 
is disagreement with our partner 1 2 3 4 5 
8. We will use our expertise to make a decision 
based on our proposal 1 2 3 4 5 
9. We will tell our partner our ideas and ask 
them for their ideas 1 2 3 4 5 
10. We will make interpretations of written agreement 
in order to convince our partner 1 2 3 4 5 
11. We will use "give and take" so that a compromise 
can bemade 1 2 3 4 5 
12. We will use our power to win a competitive situation 1 2 3 4 5 
13. We will try to find a position that is intermediate 
between their position and our position 1 2 3 4 5 
14. We will use written agreements as a "tool" to get 
the partner to agree to our positions 1 2 3 4 5 
15. We will show our partner the logic and 
benefits of our position 1 2 3 4 5 
16. We will try to find a fair combination of gains 
and losses for both parties 2 3 4 5 
17. We will try to stay away from disagreement with them 2 3 4 5 
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D. Ideal State of Relationship 
The following statements relate to your company's attitude toward relationships between joint venture partners. 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with each of the statements. 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
1. All discrepancies in performance or 
benefit between partners, small or 
big, should be monitored. 1 2 3 4 
2. Partners should stay together in the 
face of adversity/challenge 1 2 3 4 
3. The relationship should be flexible in accommodating 
one another if special problems/needs arise 2 3 4 
4. '.fhe relationship should extend across 
complex responsibilities and multiple 
tasks beyond economic transactions 1 2 3 4 
5. Disagreements between partners will likely increase 
the productivity of their working relationship 1 2 3 4 
E. National Culture's Influence 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
1. Chinese managers perceive things like us 
2. Our cultural values are different from 
Chinese managers' 
3. Chinese managers behave like us 




Name of the joint venture----------------
Line of business --------------------
Total number of employees ____ _ 




American partner (s) Share % 
















General Manager of the joint venture is assigned by Your company [ ] Chinese partner [ ] 
What percent of the departmental managers in the joint venture are from your parent company __ % 
Technology of the joint venture is supplied primarily by Your company [ ] Chinese partner [) 
Your current title in the joint venture ----------------------~ 
How many years you have worked in the joint venture? ___ years 
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